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Information trustworthiness is a major issue in crowdsourcing application. In more
detail, the practice of leveraging internet communities, commonly referred to as crowds,
and social mobilisation for data collection tasks, taking advantage from the low cost of
hiring people using conventional crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk or Crowdflower, and the global take up of mobile technologies through internet
users, is threatened by the issue of untrustworthy users submitting low quality data.
Then, one of the biggest challenges in this context is how to infer reliable knowledge
from crowdsourced information, in particular how to fuse data reported by untrustworthy
user, In particular, such users are typically only interested in the monetary reward
paid for executing the task, thus exerting the minimum effort in taking observations so
producing low quality data.
Against this background, the research presented in this report investigates reliable in-
ference approaches to the fusion of unreliable data in crowdsourcing applications. In
particular, we present two new models that formally model the concept of user trust-
worthiness in data fusion and spatial regression tasks with untrustworthy data. We
then provide two algorithms that estimate the trustworthiness of each user and the
fused output under such models. Furthermore, empirical results on synthetic and real-
world datasets show the efficacy of our approach against the state-of-the-art algorithms.
Finally, future work will focus on further extending our models to improve their appli-
cability and on addressing the other requirements for a reliable crowdsourcing platform
that are still open questions in our research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last decade, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new data-collection technique
whose principle is to harvest the 2.17 billion internet users1 (31.5% of the world’s popu-
lation) and spur them to get involved in micro-tasks, such as solving a problem, answer-
ing a question, or providing data, and this, when put together, can help solve complex,
highly decentralised data-collection tasks. In particular, crowdsourcing is now widely
used for solving information gathering tasks, where crowdsourcing is an important source
of subjects for social projects and experimental research.
In more detail, in crowdsourced information gathering, a task requestor, or taskmaster
(e.g., a company, an institutional organisation or a single user) posts for the internet
community a task of gathering some environmental observations (e.g., a sensor measure-
ment, or a picture of an observed target) and, in response to this, a set of users, or task
executors, namely the physical users who accept the task, report their observations. In
practice, such information reporting processes may occur either on a voluntary basis,
where the user spontaneously submits reports of their own volition, or on a monetary
base, where a contracted reward is paid by the task requestor to the user for each report.
In addition, to support access of the task requestors to the crowdsourcing market, there
are now a number of crowdsourcing web services, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk,
Crowdflower and oDesk2 that allow users to post tasks, collect the answers and pay task
executors in this way.
The success of crowdsourcing in such applications has followed the growth of the inter-
net population and the growing free time that people dedicate to internet activities.3
Nowadays, many companies and corporations are increasingly crowdsourcing parts of
1Data source: Internet World Stats internetworldstats.com
2For reference, see mturk.com, crowdflower.com, odesk.com
3A recent survey stated that U.S people spent an average of 13 hours per week online in 2010, equal
to 74% of their free time. Source: eweek.com)
1
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Figure 1.1: The Haiti-Ushahidi project. The live Crowdmap of help requests, clus-
tered in the red blobs, submitted through social media, after the 2011 Haiti earthquake.
their everyday business operations to profit from low cost labour and additional benefits
of parallelising and decentralising the whole information gathering process.4
Furthermore, crowdsourcing approaches have been explored also in the non-profit sector
which we particularly focus on in this work. Specifically, various projects in the citizen
science and the disaster response domain showed that crowds are effective in provid-
ing valuable information for scientific and social purposes purely motivated by intrinsic
motivations, such as personal interests and social incentives.5 Technologically, this is
particularly driven by the fact that today 1.08 billion people6 (i.e. half of the internet’s
users) are equipped with smartphones and other mobile technologies, with 3G internet
connection, that is used as an on-board computing platform equipped with video sen-
sor, camera sensor and Global Positioning System (GPS) sensor. In particular, such
a worldwide distribution of internet-connected users can be used to retrieve data from
remote areas by asking people to submit the requested information content through
their cell phones. In this context, the disaster management domain has been witness to
the great potential of such crowdsourcing from the ubiquitous networks of local users
where, concretely, a number of projects that followed the recent environmental disasters
and humanitarian crisis leveraged local people to provide real-time information to first
responders or to international monitoring organisations. For example, after the devas-
tating earthquake in Haiti, 2011, a mapping platform called Ushahidi (ushahidi.com),
was set up to allow people to fill a map by reporting geo-tagged facts of disaster events
located in their area, such as trapped persons or damaged buildings. This created a
crowdsourced live map of the disaster that was useful to the first responders to coor-
dinate their rescue operations (Figure 1.1). Also, during the political crisis in Egypt,
4For examples, see threadless.com, istockphoto.com and innocentive.com)
5For examples, see ispot.com and ushahidi.com
6Data source: The Next Web thenextweb.com
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2011, people sent reports to the Arabic Network of Human Right Information (ANHRI,
anhri.net) through a mobile app to document the atrocities happening around them
and help the international community to monitor the evolution of the crisis.
Beyond the disaster response domain, the same modalities of leveraging people ubiqui-
tously located as problem solvers or data providers is also currently used for security
purposes by the UK police, that asks the public to help identify images of suspects by
sharing them with the users living in the neighbourhood where the suspect was sighted
through a mobile phone app (Facewatch, facewatch.co.uk), or by the US police to
crowdsource the patrol of the Texas-Mexico boarder by asking people to watch the im-
ages of internet cameras and report suspicious events (Watchboard, 2006).
In all these scenarios, the mobilisation of people to report information can be a key
contribution to successful disaster management, potentially helping to save more human
lives (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010). However, together with all its advantages, crowd-
sourcing also poses new challenges about how to manage the vast amount of information
generated by such a mass social mobilisation. In particular, the primary challenge for
task requestors is to convert to, or to fuse, the dataset collected through the crowd
into a global prediction of the output. Specifically, such a data fusion problem typically
involves to find the correct answer among the dataset of redundant observations. In
some cases, crowdsourcing involve collecting observations of a non-stationary quantity,
for example an radiation map or a weather map. In these cases, the fusion problem is
to estimate the function that is likely to represents the observed environmental process.
Another challenge is to cope with the uncertainty about the trustworthiness of each
report as there is no absolute guarantee as to what the user has reported is accurate and
correct. For example, in the Hait-Ushahidi project there were cases of people misreport-
ing the real urgency of their submitted help request to get more food or to receive help
sooner, or in the Egypt-ANHRI project, some people could not report events genuinely
as they could have an interest to hide the real happenings to the international commu-
nity. More in general, the trustworthiness of crowd generated content is the issue that
this work addresses in the context of fusing data and inferring the unobserved ground
truth of crowdsourced problems. Thus, the intent of this work is to provides models and
solutions that could help clarify the issue of how safe is it to trust and make inference
with cheap information gathered from crowds.
In more detail, this issue of information reliability arises from the fact that people are
not always accurate and have subjective biases as lay observers. In particular, user
misreporting in crowdsourcing can be motivated by the fact that some users are only
interested in receiving the reward paid for the task, therefore they do not commit to
exert the required effort to execute the task, so producing low quality data, e.g. a wrong
radioactivity measure or an inaccurate estimate of a location target. In addition, some
users might even have an interest in misleading the decision of the task requestor to
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their advantage, for instance to get more food or to receive a rescue intervention more
promptly, or to delocalise the search for a subject by the police. All of these concerns feed
the criticism that crowdsourced information is highly unreliable and that crowdsourced
solutions may not always be a reliable alternative to the traditional approach of hiring
a team of experts for the same purposes.
Against this background, we argue that there is a need for new intelligent systems to
tackle the challenge of making reliable inference on crowdsourced information under
the uncertainty of the individual trustworthiness of the users. Such systems should
help task requestors to find the true value among a set of redundant, and perhaps
contradictory, reported observations by identifying which reports are more reliable and
which should be discarded. However, the challenge for such a system to address is a
complex decision-making problem in a setting of many real-world problems where a
report not only consists of a simple observed value but it could also include some values
characterising the uncertainty of the user about its observation, such as the precision of a
sensor or a reported confidence level of an observation. Furthermore, as discussed above,
a crowdsourcing problem could be targeted at estimating a spatio-temporal function,
such a radiation map, a temperature map or a weather map, for which inference is more
challenging because of the requirement of taking such a spatial and temporal correlation
of the data into account to make reliable predictions of the underlying function.
Against this background, this research is concerned with exploring new Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) approaches to the problem of making reliable inference on untrustworthy
crowdsourced information and is targeted at providing new inference models and algo-
rithm to be applicable to a wide range of real crowdsourcing problems.
1.1 Research Requirements
From the discussion of the problem in the previous section, this following are the key
requirements for this research:
Req. 1: Data Fusion for Crowdsourced Stationary Targets.
The first basic requirement for the algorithm is to be able to estimate the
value of a crowdsourced stationary target, i.e. a quantity that can be assumed
to remain unchanged throughout the observation process. For instance, this
requirement is relevant for the problem of crowdsourcing a location target,
such as the position of a radio mast (see Chapter 3 for more details) or to
localise a person trapped in a building. Specifically, the algorithm must be
able to estimate the observed target feature (e.g., the location) as accurately as
possible, while dealing with the individual subjectivity and the trustworthiness
of the reports.
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Req. 2: Spatio-Temporal Inference for Crowdsourced Non-Stationary Tar-
gets.
Extending the previous requirement, the system must also be able to estimate
the ground truth for a crowdsourced non-stationary target. In more detail, this
requirement refers to the problem of crowdsourcing a spatio-temporal function,
such as a radiation field, a temperature map, or a weather map (see chapter 5
for more details), where the output of the algorithm must be an spatio-temporal
estimate of the process that people are trying to observe.
Req. 3: Predictive Uncertainty.
When estimating the ground truth, a key requirement for the algorithm is
to provide information about the uncertainty of its prediction, also called its
predictive uncertainty (Quinonero-Candela et al., 2006). This is an essential
requirement for many decision making tasks. For example, on awareness of the
risk of inefficiently allocating the limited rescue forces, a rescue operator would
prefer a prediction saying: “there is 40% probability that a person is trapped
in this building” rather than the much less informative statement: “there is
a person trapped in this building”. Crucially, the algorithm must provide the
value of the predictive uncertainty as part of its prediction in order to evaluate
the informativeness of its estimate.
Req. 4: Considering Reported Uncertainties.
As discussed earlier, learning from human data must involve dealing with the
uncertainty in the reports that relates to the subjectivity and accuracy of the
human observers. In this respect, an important aspect to consider is the re-
ported uncertainty that at times the user provides to describe the inaccuracies
that it is aware of in its observations. Specifically, the user could report the
precision of its observation obtained through self appraisal of its degree of con-
fidence about the submitted answer, e.g. Likert-scale value used in a crowd-
sourced questionnaire, or empirically derived from the measuring tool. For
instance, for reporting GPS locations, such a precision is provided by the GPS
receiver itself on the basis of the number and geometry of the satellites being
used to generate the fix. Thus, such crowdsourcing must permit solutions in
which the report set includes not only pointwise observations, but also reported
uncertainties.
Req. 5: Learning User Trustworthiness.
To be able to make reliable predictions of the ground truth, an essential re-
quirement is to estimate the trustworthiness of each report and correlate it to
the individual trustworthiness of each user. Specifically, we consider a report
as untrustworthy, with respect to the observed target, when its value is signif-
icantly distant from the real target value and, in turn, an untrustworthy user
is the one that consistently reports untrustworthy observations. Thus, learning
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user trustworthiness is crucial for the algorithm to improve the accuracy of its
inference, as opposed to the approach of considering all reports as being equally
trustworthy (which is likely to lead to poor quality estimates).
Req. 6: Verification.
A way to reduce the uncertainty about the degree of trustworthiness of a re-
port is verification, i.e. to ask a trusted (or more trusted) verifier to check and
approve some reported information. Alternatively, when such a verifier user
is not available, a way to verify a report is based on redundancy, i.e. repeat-
edly getting extra independent observations from the crowd. However, from
the taskmaster’s perspective, verification must be driven by a certain level of
accuracy that it desires to achieve on its data with respect to a limited budget
that it allocates to verification. Thus, the requirement for the algorithm is
to efficiently use the available budget to reach the required data accuracy in
verification.
Req. 7: Incentivising Truthful Reporting.
Finally, another way to improve information trustworthiness is to provide in-
centives to the user to report truthfully their observations. Specifically, this
requirement refers to leveraging the rewards paid to the user within an appro-
priate incentive scheme that guarantees that it will always exert the maximum
effort in taking its observation and will not deviate from reporting the truly ob-
served value. In this way, such incentives should reduce the uncertainty about
trustworthiness of an individual report and should leave potentially only the
component of human subjectivity and limited accuracy as a source of noise in
the data.
Against these requirements, this work mainly focusses on the first four of them i.e. infer-
ence models for crowdsourcing stationary (requirement 1) and non-stationary quantities
(requirement 2), while considering user trustworthiness (requirement 3) and reported
uncertainty (requirement 4), and providing estimates of predictive uncertainty (require-
ment 5). The other requirements of information verification (requirement 6) and in-
centive engineering for truthful reporting (requirement 7) are left as part of the future
work.
1.2 Research Challenges
For this problem, there are a number of challenges that must be addressed for a solu-
tion to meet the requirements identified above. In particular, we discuss the three key
challenges that we have addressed in this work to date:
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1. When estimating a target value using crowdsourced data, a major challenge is
to assume that such a problem’s ground truth is unknown to the algorithm. For
example, this is the case when first responders want to crowdsource the map of
damaged buildings (see the example of the Haiti-Ushahidi project described earlier)
or to monitor an dangerous nuclear cloud spreading across a disaster area, as it
happened in the aftermath of the 2010 Fukushima earthquake in Japan. In such
cases, it is difficult for the algorithm to evaluate the quality of its prediction or
to estimate the trustworthiness of a report in when the problem’s ground truth is
not available.
2. The second challenge is to deal with the inaccuracies of human information. This
is a key aspect to take into consideration when computing the aggregate of the
reports into a single output. In more detail, crowdsourcing is a domain in which
the information sources are humans, that act as observers and play the role of soft
sensors in the emergent network of local responders. This moves beyond the use
of traditional hard sensors to locate, characterise and describe physical and non
physical targets. Clearly, however, data provided by humans is different from con-
ventional sensor data in terms of subjectivity, malicious behaviour and the limited
accuracy of human observers (Hall and Jordan, 2010). For example, the Ushahidi
teams estimated that only the 1% of the 4000 Haiti-Ushahidi reports could be clas-
sified as reliable while the remaining set of these contained several false reports and
misreported help requests due to people incentivised by the emergency situation
to get more food aids for themselves. Thus, the challenge for the algorithm is to
fuse crowdsourced data by seeking new fusion methods for dealing with human
information that go beyond the data fusion methods for traditional hard sensors .
3. Finally, to use redundancy to verify a report, or to identify the most likely ag-
gregated output, an important issue to address is how to get redundancy when
the reports refer to a non-stationary function target (Requirement 2). Generally
speaking, it is easy to create redundancy in the data for a static target case by
just getting an extra report from the crowd. However, it is much harder to have
redundant reports for a spatio-temporal target as, in fact, it is unlikely to get
two reports from exactly the same location, or it might be impossible to ask for
a report from a previous observation. Thus, the challenge is to characterise the
concept of redundancy in the function space for the computing the aggregated
output on untrustworthy spatio-temporal observations.
From these challenges, a number of research communities have been trying to find solu-
tions to various assets of the overarching problem. These communities include the fields
of human computation, citizen science, machine learning and multi-agent systems,. In
particular, some work addressed the problem of inferring the ground truth from a set
of noisy observations reported from multiple users (Bachrach et al., 2012; Kamar et al.,
Chapter 1 Introduction 8
2012; Welinder et al., 2010; Whitehill et al., 2009). However, none of the existing so-
lutions focus on the aspect of considering reported user uncertainties as part of the
input data outlined in the requirement 3, while they only consider the setting of users
reporting pointwise observations. As such, inference in such models can be improved by
considering the precisions reported by the users as an indication of the reliability of an
observation.
In terms of addressing the problem of aggregating a set of reported estimates, a vast
literature from the data fusion field provides a number of techniques to effectively fuse
multiple noisy sensor estimates (see Section 2.3 form more details). However, while
such multi-sensor fusion techniques could potentially be applied also in crowdsourcing,
exploiting the paradigm of human usersas soft sensors (although this has not been done
in previous work yet), the issue in doing this is that the notion of noise as modelled in
sensor fusion does not capture the broader dimensions of uncertainty of human data.
Thus, we seek new fusion techniques specialised on human data to be potentially more
suitable for inference in the crowdsourcing setting.
Against this background, the research presented in this report investigates novel infer-
ence models and algorithms to deal with untrustworthy information in crowdsourcing.
Specifically, the objective of this work is to provide new solutions to the problems of (i)
fusing multiple untrustworthy estimates into a single prediction the ground truth and
(ii) assessing the trustworthiness of a single user. By doing this, we expect to improve
the reliability of crowdsourcing tools by making them more suitable and more robust
for large-scale applications.
1.3 Research Contributions
Against the requirements and challenges described above, the contributions of this report
to the state of the art are stated as follows:
• We provide a novel trust-based data fusion model which addresses the problem of
crowdsourcing stationary quantities, with a dataset comprising reported observa-
tions and precisions. The salient feature of such models is to formally represent
the concept of user trustworthiness to capture the uncertainty about the reliability
the user’s reports. Specifically, such a model represent trustworthiness as a latent
scaling parameter of the uncertainty of an estimates. In this way, the effect is
gradually de-emphasize noise on an untrustworthy estimate in the fused output.
In more detail, the contribution of this work is presented in the following paper:
M. Venanzi, A. Rogers, N.R. Jennings. Considering trustworthiness for
fusing crowdsourced data. To be submitted to the 12th International
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Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS),
2013.
• We provide the first algorithm, called MaxTrust, that, applies our user trust model
to the problem crowdsourced target localisation problem. This algorithm infers the
location of the target through the fusion the reports taking into account the level
of trustworthiness of each report, and provides the estimates of the trustworthiness
of each user.
• We also introduce a new trust-based inference approach for crowdsourcing non-
stationary quantities. Specifically, we provide the first trust-based heteroscedastic
Gaussian process regression model, called TrustHGP, to address the problem of
inferring a spatial function from untrustworthy location-based observations. Such
a model has the qualities of making spatial predictions of the observed function and
estimating the trustworthiness of each user using the principled Bayesian inference
framework of the Gaussian process.
• We show that both our algorithm are affective in solving real crowdsourcing prob-
lems through their empirical evaluation on real-world datasets. Specifically, for the
data fusion model, we evaluate MaxTrust with an experiment on cell tower localisa-
tion using crowdsourced cell phone data provided provided by the OpenSignalMap
project (opensignalmap.com). In particular, we show that our algorithm improves
by 21% (on average, corresponding to an error lowered by 185 meters) the accuracy
in localising the cell towers. Then, for our spatial inference model, we evaluate
our TrustHGP on the key disaster response application of crowdsourced radiation
monitoring using data from the 2011 Fukishima nuclear disaster provided by the
network crowdsourced sensors connected to the Cosm platform (cosm.com). In
particular, we show that the TrustHGP outperforms the standard GP approaches
in making more accurate, by 13%, and more informative, by 89%, spatial predi-
cions of radiation levels.
1.4 Report Outline
The remainder of this report is structured as follows.
In Chapter 2, we provide the background to this work by reviewing research related to
reliable crowdsourcing, with emphasis on data fusion and spatial regression models.
In Chapter 3, addressing the problem of crowdsourcing static targets, we present our
trust-based data fusion model for crowdsourced target localisation and detail the Max-
Trust algorithm to estimate the target and the trustworthiness of each user jointly. This
includes an empirical evaluation of the algorithm on location data with an experiment
of cell tower localisation.
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In Chapter 4, addressing the problem of crowdsourcing non-stationary functions, we
present our trust-based, heteroscedastic Gaussian process regression model and describe
the TrustHGP algorithm for learning the latent trustworthiness parameters under such a
model. This includes the evaluate of the algorithm on the Cosm dataset of crowdsourced
nuclear radiation sensor data.
Chapter 5 concludes and outlines the future work to follow this research, including a
detailed plan of the activities until the completion of the PhD.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we review the key background research relating to the problem of un-
trustworthy information in crowdsourcing applications that will provide the theories for
the models and the algorithms presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Specifically, the chapter
begins with an overview of computational approaches to trust assessment in crowd-
sourcing (Section 4.1.1). Subsequently, Section 3.1.1 reviews the approaches to reliable
crowdsourcing, in particular discussing the problem of aggregating multiple reports and
introducing algorithms from the data fusion (Section 3.1.2) and spatial regression (Sec-
tion 2.4) literatures. Finally, Section 4.4 summarises the contribution of the existing
work against our problem’s requirements that we described in the previous chapter
(Section 1.2) and the limitations that need to be addressed by our research.
2.1 Approaches for Trusting Users
In the previous chapter, we argued that making crowdsourced information more reliable
is primarily concerned with evaluating the trustworthiness of the reports and, on such a
basis, assessing the trustworthiness of the reporters (see Section 1.2). In this respect, this
section introduces some approaches to computational trust that are useful to address
this requirement.
The first general approach to determining the trustworthiness of a user is to rely on
historical data, and possibly also reputation reports from third parties, to infer the user’s
reliability (Ramchurn and Jennings, 2005). In this way, trustworthiness evaluation is
supported by some empirical evidence of how the user behaved in the past with the
system. However, one difficulty of applying such an approach in crowdsourcing is given
by the openness of the crowd, i.e participants can join and leave at any time, and it is
easy for a crowd member to anonymise its identity. This openness can make it unlikely
to have multiple encounters with the same users which, in turns, makes it hard to assess
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their reputation. In addition, building trust relying on historical data is unreliable
when there are users that strategise with their reports to build a deceptive image of
their reputation in the eyes of the taskmaster (Archak and Sundararajan, 2009). Since
strategic behaviour of this kind is highly likely in a human reporter, we will not consider
reputation-based trust in our work.
Alternatively, another approach to trust formation is based on consensus. That is, the
technique of computing user trustworthiness according to the number of other indepen-
dent observations within the crowd matching the one reported by the user (Kamar and
Horvitz, 2012). Generally speaking, the consensus approach is typically applied when
the majority assumption holds, i.e. the majority of the opinions will eventually agree on
the ground truth, thus the consensus opinion is likely to reveal such ground truth. Also,
as the majority assumption relates to datasets with high redundancy, then consensus in
crowdsourcing is supported by the fact that it is relatively easy to create redundancy in
the data by gathering extra reports at low cost. For this reason, many existing models
advocate the consensus approach as a possible solution to the problem of trusting un-
known users in crowdsourcing (Kamar et al., 2012; Raykar et al., 2010; Whitehill et al.,
2009).
In practice, consensus is easy to compute for discrete classification problems where
each report can be seen as a vote on a certain outcome and the consensus outcome is
the most voted one, or for continuous classification problems by taking the average of
the reported real values as the consensus value. However, it is less straightforward to
compute consensus when the reports are estimates that includes also the precision of
an observation, as is the case in the setting that we address in this work (requirement
4). Therefore, while adopting the consensus approach for trustworthiness evaluation, we
will look at consensus techniques for crowdsourced estimates that we will review later
in this chapter (see Section 3.1.2). In what follows, we review more general, non-trust
approaches to reliable crowdsourcing.
2.2 Approaches to Reliable Crowdsourcing
In the previous chapter, we described crowdsourcing systems as human-powered tools
that are useful to solve highly decentralised information gathering tasks (Section 1.2).
We also mentioned that, for such systems, the natural core problem is to cope with
the reliability of the human sources and the trustworthiness of their reports in order to
achieve good quality results. In this section, we review the main approaches to reliable
crowdsourcing proposed in the literature that are relevant to address this requirement
(requirement 5).
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Archive) to preserve human knowledge and to
make information more accessible to the world.
The pages are photographically scanned and the
resulting bitmap images are transformed into text
files by optical character recognition (OCR) soft-
ware. This transformation into text is useful be-
cause the books can then be indexed, searched,
and stored in a format that can be easily analyzed
and manipulated. One of the stumbling blocks in
the digitization process is that OCR is far from
perfect at deciphering the words in bitmap images
of scanned texts. As we show below, for older
prints with faded ink and yellowed pages, OCR
cannot recognize about 20% of the words. By
contrast, humans are more accurate at transcribing
such print. For example, two humans using the
“key and verify” technique, where each types the
text independently and then any discrepancies are
identified, can achievemore than 99% accuracy at
the word level (4, 5). Unfortunately, human tran-
scribers are expensive, so only documents of ex-
treme importance are manually transcribed.
Our apparatus, called “reCAPTCHA,” is used
by more than 40,000 Web sites (6) and dem-
onstrates that old print material can be tran-
scribed, word by word, by having people solve
CAPTCHAs throughout the World Wide Web.
Whereas standard CAPTCHAs display images
of random characters rendered by a computer,
reCAPTCHA displays words taken from scanned
texts. The solutions entered by humans are used to
improve the digitization process. To increase effi-
ciency and security, only thewords that automated
OCR programs cannot recognize are sent to hu-
mans. However, to meet the goal of a CAPTCHA
(differentiating between humans and computers),
the system needs to be able to verify the user’s
answer. To do this, reCAPTCHA gives the user
two words, the one for which the answer is not
known and a second “control” word for which
the answer is known. If users correctly type the
control word, the system assumes they are human
and gains confidence that they also typed the other
word correctly (Fig. 1). We describe the exact
process below.
We start with an image of a scanned page.
Two different OCR programs analyze the image;
their respective outputs are then aligned with
each other by standard string matching algo-
rithms (7) and compared to each other and to an
English dictionary. Any word that is deciphered
differently by both OCR programs or that is not
in the English dictionary ismarked as “suspicious.”
These are typically the words that the OCR pro-
grams failed to decipher correctly. According to
our analysis, about 96%of these suspicious words
are recognized incorrectly by at least one of the
OCR programs; conversely, 99.74% of the words
not marked as suspicious are deciphered correctly
by both programs. Each suspicious word is then
placed in an image along with another word for
which the answer is already known, the twowords
are distorted further to ensure that automated pro-
grams cannot decipher them, and the resulting
image is used as a CAPTCHA. Users are asked to
type both words correctly before being allowed
through. We refer to the word whose answer
is already known as the “control word” and to
the new word as the “unknown word.” Each
reCAPTCHA challenge, then, has an unknown
word and a control word, presented in random
order. To lower the probability of automated pro-
grams randomly guessing the correct answer, the
control words are normalized in frequency; for
example, the more common word “today” and
the less common word “abridged” have the same
probability of being served. The vocabulary of
control words contains more than 100,000 items,
so a program that randomly guesses a word would
only succeed 1/100,000 of the time (8). Addi-
tionally, only words that both OCR programs
failed to recognize are used as control words.
Thus, any program that can recognize these words
with nonnegligible probability would represent an
improvement over state-of-the-art OCRprograms.
To account for human error in the digitiza-
tion process, reCAPTCHA sends every suspi-
cious word to multiple users, each time with a
different random distortion. At first, it is displayed
as an unknown word. If a user enters the correct
answer to the associated control word, the user’s
other answer is recorded as a plausible guess for
the unknown word. If the first three human
guesses match each other, but differ from both
of the OCRs’ guesses, then (and only then) the
word becomes a control word in other chal-
lenges. In case of discrepancies among human
answers, reCAPTCHA sends the word to more
humans as an “unknown word” and picks the
answer with the highest number of “votes,”
where each human answer counts as one vote
and each OCR guess counts as one half of a
vote (recall that these words all have been pre-
viously processed by OCR). In practice, these
weights seem to yield the best results, though
our accuracy is not very sensitive to them (as
long as more weight is given to human guesses
than OCR guesses). A guess must obtain at least
2.5 votes before it is chosen as the correct
spelling of the word for the digitization process.
Hence, if the first two human guesses match
each other and one of the OCRs, they are con-
sidered a correct answer; if the first three guesses
match each other but do not match either of the
OCRs, they are considered a correct answer, and
the word becomes a control word. To account
for words that are unreadable, reCAPTCHA has
a button that allows users to request a new pair
of words. When six users reject a word before
any correct spelling is chosen, the word is dis-
carded as unreadable. After all suspicious words
in a text have been deciphered, we apply a post-
processing step because human users make a
variety of predictable mistakes (see supporting
online text). From analysis of our data, 67.87%
of the words required only two human responses
to be considered correct, 17.86% required three,
7.10% required four, 3.11% required five, and
only 4.06% required six or more (this includes
words discarded as unreadable).
A large-scale deployment of the system has
enabled us to collect a number of findings (see
supporting online text for more details about the
deployment). The first finding is that the process
of deciphering words with CAPTCHAs can
match the highest-quality guarantee given by
dedicated human transcription services. A ran-
dom sample of 50 scanned articles from five
different years (1860, 1865, 1908, 1935, and
1970) of the New York Times archive (http://
nytimes.com) was chosen and manually tran-
scribed by two professionals to estimate the per-
word accuracy of reCAPTCHA, including the
postprocessing corrections mentioned above.
The total number of words was 24,080. Each
word counted as a “hit” if the algorithm de-
ciphered the entire word correctly or a “miss” if
any of the letters were wrong. The error rate was
defined as the number of misses divided by the
Fig. 1. The reCAPTCHA
system displays words
from scanned texts to
humans on the World
Wide Web. In this exam-
ple, the word “morning”
was unrecognizable by
OCR. reCAPTCHA isolated
the word, distorted it
using random transfor-
mations including add-
ing a line through it,
and then presented it
as a challenge to a user.
Because the original
word (“morning”) was
not recognized by OCR,
another word for which
the answer was known
(“overlooks”) was also
presented to determine
if the user entered the
correct answer.
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Figure 2.1: Example of gold-based quality assessment performed by ReCAPTCHA.
The correctness of the user’s answer to the unknown challenge word (morning) is eval-
uated on the basis of its answer to the known control word (overlooks).
2.2.1 Gold-Based Approach
The gold-based approach aims to identify unreliable users with a set of predefined ground
truths, or gold standards (Oleson et al., 2011). Specifically, each user is trained on the
gold set, i.e. the set of tasks with gold standards, and its trustworthiness is evaluated on
the basis of the discrepancy between its answers and the correct one. Currently, many
crowdsourcing platforms adopt gold-based mechanisms to provide assurance of data reli-
ability to task requestors, including Amazon Mechamical Turk(mturk.com) , Crowflower
(crowdflower.com) and ReCAPTCHA (recaptcha.net). For example, both Amazon
Mechanicical Turk and Crowdflower offer the feature of specifying gold standards when
creating Human Intelligent Tasks (HITs). Also, ReCAPTCHA, a tool that uses human
answers to digitalise text, performs the control word test to decide whether an input
answer to an unknown word is trustworthy or not (Figure 2.1). Specifically, such a test
consists of presenting two words to the user in random sequence, where one of the two
words is the actual challenge word that is unknown, and the other one is the control
word that is known. In such a way, since the user does not know which of the two is the
control word, this test is likely to increase the chances that the challenge word will by
typed correctly.
However, one disadvantage of the gold-based approach is that the cost of training users
with gold standards is not always supported by an absolute guarantee of substantial
gain in the quality of the data (Ipeirotis, 2010). Also, since we base our work on the
unsupervised setting where gold standard are not available (requirement 2), then gold-
based solutions will not be considered in this report.
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2.2.2 Machine Learning Approach
Another approach to deal with the uncertainty of user reliability is to apply machine
learning techniques to the data and try to estimate the correct answer and also learn
some additional information about the task and the users. In general, the machine
leaning approach in crowdsourcing consists of designing a statistical model of a crowd
reporting process and then applying standard inference algorithms to estimate unob-
served parameters based on the data gathered from the crowd (Dawid and Skene, 1979;
Whitehill et al., 2009; Bachrach et al., 2012). In particular, there are a number of ex-
isting inference models that address the requirement of learning the ground truth from
unreliable reports that is part of our problem. We review these models in the remainder
of this sub-section.
2.2.2.1 EM Approach
The first algorithm to infer the answer for a classification task from multiple reports
was proposed by Dawid and Skene in 1979 (well before the advent of crowdsourcing) to
study the advantage of using low-cost noisy labellers for an image annotation task in the
context of supervised learning. Specifically, the base of their algorithm is expectation-
maximisation (EM): a well-known iterative method to find the maximum likelihood
estimates of the parameters in a statistical model (Dempster et al., 1977). In more
detail, the EM approach for a crowdsourcing problem consists of having an expecta-
tion step in which the correct answer is estimated from the data based on the current
model parameters, where such parameters typically define the dependencies of the global
output from the single observation, and then a maximisation step that updates such pa-
rameters by maximising the likelihood of the model. Ultimately, EM has been applied to
more complicated problems such as image labelling, galaxy classification and IQ testing
(Whitehill et al., 2009; Kamar et al., 2012; Bachrach et al., 2012). Furthermore, other
work has used the Bayesian version of EM that considers some prior probabilities in
the model and obtains posterior estimates of the parameters using the same iterative
algorithm (DeGroot, 2004). This Bayesian approach is particularly useful when some
prior knowledge about the problem is available. For example, we might know that some
observations are more reliable than others and so chose the appropriate priors. This
approach can lead to more accurate inference; as was shown by Raykar et al. (2010)
in a crowdsourcing application of classifying cancer diagnoses in the medical domain.
More generally, the EM approach is associated with the graphical modelling technique
that has inspired the majority of work presented in this area, as it enables a clear and
explicit design of a crowdsourcing model. As these models address the requirement of es-
timating the global output (requirement 3) and also the trustworthiness of each reporter
(requirement 5), then we review them in the next section.
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Figure 2.2: Graphical models proposed in previous work for crowdsourced image
labelling (a, b) IQ testing (c)
2.2.2.2 Graphical Models
In machine learning, graphical models are tools for representing an arbitrary probabil-
ity distribution as a graph and so highlight its factorisation properties (Bishop, 2006).
Specifically, a graphical model represents a set of random variable as nodes, distinguish-
ing between observed nodes (shaded) and unobserved or latent nodes (unshaded), and
directed links describe probabilistic dependencies between pairs of nodes. In these mod-
els, inference flows through the graph from the sources (nodes with no incoming links) to
the leafs (nodes with no outgoing links) based on the conditional dependencies outlined
by the links. In such a way, it is possible to estimate the probability densities of the
latent nodes based on the data feeding the observed nodes.
A number of graphical models for crowdsourcing problems were recently presented, some
of these are showed in Figure 2.2. In detail, Whitehill et al. (2009) model an image
labelling task considering a set of n images, each of which belongs to one of two possible
categories (e.g. face/non-face, male/female), and assuming that the observed label Li,j
reported by labeler i for the image j depends upon the true binary label Zj , the image
difficulty βj and the expertise of the labeler αi (Figure 2.2 (a)). Then, putting Gaussian
priors on α and β, the maximum-a-posteriori inference of the parameters is made through
the EM algorithm. Furthermore, Welinder et al. (2010) extend this model to consider
the accuracy of the labeler in a multidimensional space, with variables representing the
competence, the expertise and the bias of the labeler, i.e. the α,w and τ parameters
respectively (Figure 2.2 (b)). Finally, Bachrach et al. (2012) introduced a graphical
model to analyse the responses from multiple participants to a set of questions and find
the correct answer for each question, the difficulty level of the answer and the ability
of the participants (Figure 2.2 (c)). In this context, all these algorithms were shown to
empirically outperform the na¨ıve majority voting approach i.e. find the correct answer
as the one that received the largest number of votes amongst the users.
In general, inference algorithms based on graphical models are the first concrete solution
for the learning problem in crowdsourcing. However, the main issue of such a graphical
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modelling approach is that, while the model can be arbitrarily complicated by adding
new nodes to the graph, inference can rapidly become analytically intractable. For this
reason, a number of techniques to approximate posterior inference on graphical models
are available, among these expectation-propagation, variational methods and sampling
methods (see Bishop (2006) for a detailed overview). However the problem of such
approximation techniques is that they are prone to find sub-optimal solutions in non-
convex problems or to require many samples to achieve a good level of approximation.
Specifically for our problem, none of the discussed models considers observations with
reported uncertainty as we require (Requirement 4), instead they focus only on pointwise
observations, i.e. observations consisting of a single value with no numerical uncertainty.
Therefore, using a similar probabilistic approach, in this work we will go a step forward
in modelling also the precision reported by the user as part of the input data.
2.3 Data Fusion Methods for Untrustworthy Data
Addressing the requirement of fusing multiple observations into a global estimate, which
is part of requirements 1 and 2, this section introduces data fusion methods. In partic-
ular, data fusion research studies how to integrate estimates from multiple sources to
perform more efficient inference (Thrun et al., 2001). Typically, data fusion considers
information sources as physical sensors that are employed in a target monitoring task,
where each sensor provides observations of the target in its monitoring area, and fusion
algorithms deal with how to aggregate the set of sensor observations into a single es-
timate to accurately predict the target position. In addition, as sensors are noisy, the
requirement for such algorithms is to detect unreliable sensors and filter their noise in
the fused estimate.
Thus, in the traditional data fusion approach, the human user is primarily viewed as an
interpreter of the processing result that ultimately transforms the fused estimate into
knowledge, and only rarely input data from human observers is considered. However, as
discussed in Section 1.2, crowdsourcing introduces the new view of having humans acting
as sensors and using their smart phones as an on-board computing platform to provide
observations. For this reason, a new focus is emerging that studies the applicability of
the current multi-sensor fusion algorithms to human information. In this vein, Hall and
Jordan (2010) point out the key differences between information produced by humans
compared to sensor information that needs to be taken into account in the fusion process.
Particularly, they highlight the different types of noise from the two data sources, arguing
that the inaccuracies of a sensor reading typically depends on the faults that temporally
or permanently affect the functioning of the sensor, while it is unrealistic to think that
the sensor would deliberately misreport its observation as might occur in crowdsourcing
settings. Thus, while the problem of dealing with unreliable estimates in sensor fusion
Chapter 2 Background 17
is typically a problem modelling the sensor faults, now the changing role of humans
in information fusion introduces new types of noise in the data related to subjectivity,
expertise and bias of the human observers.
From this, we identify data fusion as a suitable methodology to meet requirements 1 and
2, although we require fusion methods that can effectively deal with the noise of human
data. To this end, we now provide an overview of two standard fusion techniques for
fusing multiple probabilistic estimates referring to the single-hypothesis and the multi-
hypothesis fusion case. Then, we will review the outlier detection approach to address
the problem of identifying untrustworthy estimates. Finally, we will discuss the class of
algorithms specialised on learning sensor trustworthiness in sensor fusion.
2.3.1 Single-Hypothesis Case
In the single-hypothesis case, the set of observations refers to only one hypothesis of a
correct answer. For example, a single-hypothesis crowdsoucing problem is typically the
situation of collecting multiple observations of a static location target, such as cell tower
locations, in which the output of the fusion of the set of independent location reports
is single estimate of the actual tower location. In this case, the standard approach is to
fuse the estimates together to reduce their noise in the merged estimate. Specifically,
the covariance intersection (CI) method (Julier and Uhlmann, 2001) that is the standard
method to fuse two Gaussian estimates is described below.
Covariance Intersection: Given two normally distributed estimates e1 = (µ1,Σ1)
and e2 = (µ2,Σ2), where µ is the mean and Σ is the covariance matrix, then the
covariance intersection estimate eCI = (µˆCI , ΣˆCI ) is computed as the linear sum the
means weighted by the inverse of the covariance matrix (or precision matrix). That is:
Σˆ−1CI = Σ
−1
1 + Σ
−1
2 (2.1)
µˆCI = ΣˆCI (µ1Σ
−1
1 + µ2Σ
−1
2 ) (2.2)
Specifically, this CI method performs the fusion of multiple estimates considering both
the mean and the precision of each Gaussian estimate. Now, this method is suitable
to address the requirement 4 of considering reported uncertainties (precisions) because
we can assume that each report is a subjective estimate of the observed target that
can be fused together with the set of multiple observations through such a method. In
particular, CI fuses the estimates as weighted by their individual precisions, i.e. the
estimates with high precision (i.e. small variance in the univariate case) have higher
weight in the fusion. In addition, as stated by Equation 2.1, the fused precision Σˆ−1CI is
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Figure 2.3: Merging two Gaussian estimates, represented by the two circles, using CI
(solid line) and CU (dashed line).
computed as the sum of the precisions of each observation, therefore the uncertainty of
the fused estimate decreases as more observations are added to the set. However, the
potential issue of doing this is that the fusion can lead to wrong predictive outputs when
the dataset includes untrustworthy reports. Thus, to rectify this, and so address our
requirement 5 of performing trust-based inference, we envisage an extension of CI to take
the trustworthiness levels of each user into account. This extension will be elaborated
in our trust-based fusion model that we will present Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Multi-Hypothesis Case
In the multi-hypothesis case, there is more than one hypothesis which could be the
correct answer due to the considerable variance in the set of reported estimates. For
example, the multi-hypothesis setting occurs when the crowd observes a moving target
where different observations describe the target position in different time instants. In this
case, if the goal is to localise the target, then the conservative approach to aggregating
the reports is not to discard any hypothesis and take their union as the most general
output. Specifically the covariance union method (Reece and Roberts, 2010) to unify
two Gaussian estimate is described as follows :
Covariance Union: Given two normally distributed estimates e1 = (µ1,Σ1) and e2 =
(µ2,Σ2), where µ is the mean and Σ is the covariance matrix, then the covariance union
estimate eCU = (µˆCU , ΣˆCU ) is any Gaussian estimate defined by the following constraint:
{
ΣˆCU ≥ Σ1 + (µˆCU − µ1)(µˆCU − µ1)T
ΣˆCU ≥ Σ2 + (µˆCU − µ2)(µˆCU − µ2)T
(2.3)
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Algorithm 1 LOF
Inputs :
R : report set.
kNN(r): k nearest neighbours for a report r.
Algorithm LOF(R, k, t)
1: Define k distance(o) as the minimal distance of o from kNNs(o):
2: Compute reachability distances:
for each r ∈ R do
for each o ∈ kNN(r) do
reach distk(r, o) = max{k distance(o), dist(r, o)}
end for
end for
3: Compute local reachability distances (lrd):
for each r ∈ R do
lrd(r) =
(∑
o∈kNN(r) reach distk(r,o)
|kNN(r)|
)−1
4: end for
5: Compute local outlier factors (LOF):
for each r ∈ R do
LOF (r) =
(∑
o∈kNN(r)
lrd(o)
lrd(r)
|kNN(r)|
)−1
end for
6: Compute 〈µˆLOF , ΣˆLOF 〉 fusing the inliers with LOF (r) < t.
7: return (µˆLOF , ΣˆLOF , LOF (r))
Then, among the family of the Gaussians defined by the constraint of Equation 2.3,
the one that minimises some measurement of the size of ΣˆCU , e.g., det|Σˆ|, or the ratio
det|Σˆ|/µˆ, is usually chosen. Formally:
Σ∗CU = arg min
ΣˆCU
{det(ΣˆCU )} (2.4)
Specifically, the CU method performs hypothesis merging through inflating the variance
(in the univariate case) of the fusing estimate to include all the possible hypotheses.
By doing this, the CU estimator has the property of always being consistent with all
the possible hypothesis, as opposed to the CI estimator that at times is inconsistent
with some estimates. For example, Figure 2.3 shows two Gaussian estimates, A and B,
fused through CI and CU and it can be seen that CI is not consistent with A and B.
Therefore, CU does not explicitly require us to know which observations are trustwor-
thy and which are not, since it always takes the most general Gaussian estimate as the
aggregated output. However, the drawback of doing this is that such a CU estimate is
not very informative for making predictions due to its high level of uncertainty. Thus,
as we seek aggregators with a good trade off between prediction accuracy and low uncer-
tainty (requirement 3), the CU method will only be referred to as a conservative fusion
benchmark in our approach.
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2.3.3 Local Outlier Factor
A third way to deal with untrustworthy observations is to treat them as outliers. In
detail, recalling the definition given by Hawkins (1980): “an outlier is an observation
which deviates so much from the other observations as to arouse suspicions that it was
generated by a different mechanism”. This definition fits to the notion of an untrust-
worthy user given in Section 1.2, i.e. a user reporting observations that are significantly
distant from the others. However, this only captures certain kinds of outliers, namely
those points that outlay relative to the global dataset. For this reason, they are referred
to as “global” outliers. In this context, a more general density-based definition of out-
liers in datasets with more complex structures is given by Breunig et al. (2000); they
derive them as a point that outlies with regards to their local neighbourhood. Thus,
these outliers are regarded as “local” or density-based outliers.
Given this background, one idea is to apply outlier-detection methods to a crowdsourced
dataset to identify and remove untrustworthy observations. Subsequently, as part of
our requirement 1, we can compute the aggregated estimate using the fusion methods
described earlier applied to the inlier reports. To describe this methodology, we refer to
the density-based outlier detection method of the local outlier factor (LOF) (Breunig
et al., 2000). Specifically, such a method assigns a LOF score to each point as an indicator
of its outlier level, measuring the relative density of the point compared to its neighbours.
In doing this, it assumes that the density around an outlier is considerably different to
the density around its neighbours. In more detail, the procedure for computing LOF
scores is detailed in Algorithm 1. First, for each report r, the reachability distance of
r from its neighbour is computed (step 2), where k is the input parameter that defines
the locality region of r as the set of its k nearest neighbours. Next, Step 4 computes
the local reachability distance ldr(r) as the inverse of the mean reachability distance
between r and its neighbours. Finally, in step 5, LOF(r) is computed as the ratio of
its local reachability of r and the one of its neighbours. Once the scores are computed,
the algorithm returns the fusion of the inliers identified as the reports with LOF lower
than the threshold t. Furthermore, to measure the distance between two probabilistic
estimates required in Step 2, the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) is typically used
(Kullback and Leibler, 1951). This is a standard measure of the distance between two
probability densities that, for the case of two normal densities of dimension d, the KL
distance is expressed as follows:
KL(N (µ1,Σ1)||N (µ2,Σ2)) =1
2
(
tr(Σ−12 Σ1) + (µ2 − µ1)TΣ−12 (µ2 − µ1)
− ln
(
det(Σ1)
det(Σ2)
)
− d
)
(2.5)
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In summary, the solution to the problem of identifying unreliable reports using outlier
detection techniques is to compute the trustworthiness of each report as the LOF score
and then compute the aggregate output on the inliers set. However, in so doing, a crucial
step is to reflect the density of the report setin the choice of the outlier threshold t in
order to enable this method to detect outliers correctly. Therefore, we will include this
algorithm in our benchmarks and compare it to our approach in terms of performance
and flexibility.
2.3.4 Sensor Fusion Methods
In the sphere of multi-sensor data fusion, there is a class of methods that deal with
uncertainty sensor fusion using trust modelling techniques (Reece et al., 2009; Momani
et al., 2010; Guan et al., 2009). In more detail, such models adopt a probabilistic rep-
resentation of the uncertainty related to the reliability of a sensor and then incorporate
such an element in the data fusion model. In this class, we examine the model presented
Reece et al. (2009) that explicitly focus on a method for sensor noise recovery in presence
of unknown fault types using the concept of sensor trustworthiness. Specifically, they
provided an algorithm for a target localisation problem to estimate the target position
from a dataset of multiple sensor observations dealing with the inaccuracies deriving
from possible sensor faults. In particular, such an algorithm removes the noise from the
sensor estimates in two stages. In the first stage of noise recovery, each sensor attempts
to remove the faults from its observation based on a pre-defined set of fault models.1
Then, the second stage assigns an individual level of trustworthiness to each sensor to
characterise the noise of untrustworthy sensors. Specifically, their method evaluates
sensor trustworthiness based on redundancy and identifies untrustworthy sensors as the
outliers i.e. the sensors that report an estimate that is significantly distant from the
fused estimate. Thus, Reece et al.’s work contributes to our research as it provides (i)
a consensus rule for fusing observations gathered from untrustworthy sensors and (ii) a
method for computing the trustworthiness of each sensors based on a distance measure,
in this case the Mahalanobis distance, between the reported observation and the fusion.
In more detail, these two parts of the algorithm are described in what follows.
Consensus Rule for Fusing Untrustworthy Gaussian Estimates: Given two
univariate Gaussian estimates, e1 =< µ1, θ1 > and e2 =< µ2, θ2 >, where µ and θ are
the mean and precision of the Gaussian distribution respectively, and given t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1]
as their trustworthiness levels, then the consensus estimate between e1 and e2 is the
1Specifically, they consider drift, spike, shock and echo faults.
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Figure 2.4: Plot of the trustworthiness function used in the Reece method varying
the β parameter.
Gaussian econs =< µconsθcons >, with trustworthiness tcons that is computed as follows:
µ˜ = (θ1µ1 + θ2µ2)/(θ1 + θ2) (2.6)
µcons = t1t1µ˜+ t1(1− t2)µi + t2(1− t1)µ˜ (2.7)
θ˜ = θ1 + θ2 (2.8)
θcons = t1t2(θ˜ − (µ˜− µcons)2) + t1(1− t2)(θ1 − (µ1 + µ2cons))+ (2.9)
t2(1− t1)(θ2 − (µ2 + µ2cons))
tcons = t1 + t2 − t1t2 (2.10)
Mahalanobis Distance for Estimating Trustworthiness: Given the consensus
estimate econs =< µcons, θcons >, then the trustworthiness of an univariate Gaussian
estimate ei =< µi, θi > is defined as follows. Let Ms be the Mahalanobis distance
between econs and ei given by:
Ms =
(µcons − µi)2
(σi + σcons)
(2.11)
Then, the trustworthiness ti for the estimate ei is:
ti =
{
1 if Ms < β
exp(−(Ms − β)) otherwise
(2.12)
where β is the breakdown point in which the trustworthiness value starts to decrease
exponentially, as Figure 2.4 shows by plotting the trustworthiness function for different
β values. Then, combining these two rules of the Reece model in the EM approach
described in Section 2.2.2.1, it is possible to obtain a new algorithm that iterates between
the consensus fusion rule and the trustworthiness update rule, while appropriately tuning
the β parameter. In this way, the algorithm estimates both the predictive answer and the
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Algorithm 2 Reece Method
Inputs :
R : report set.
acc : accuracy bound.
epochs : number of training epochs.
Algorithm ReeceMethod(R)
1: Start with uniform max trust values on all the reports:
t(0) =< 1, . . . , 1 >
2: while ( |t(k−1) − t(k)| < acc or k > epochs ) do
3: (E step) Fuse the observations using the consensus rule based on
t(k−1):
f (k) = consensus(R, t(k−1))
4: (M step) Update trustworthiness parameters based on f (k):
for i = 1 : n do
tki = Ms(R, f
(k))
end for
5: end while
6: return (t(k), f (k))
user’s trustworthiness. In more detail, Algorithm 2 describes the EM implementation of
Reece’s method.
Thus, Reece et al.’s work on untrustworthy sensors provides the basis for a solution
to solve our problem. However, this algorithm is natively designed for a multi-sensor
domain that, as we discussed earlier (Section 3.1.2), is significantly different from the
crowdsourcing one. Therefore, while using the Reece method as the main benchmark for
our approach, we will empirically investigate whether this method is actually suitable
for our problem. In so doing, we also contribute to the state of the art by providing its
numerical evaluation on a crowdsourcing problem.
2.4 Crowdsourcing Spatial Functions
So far, we have discussed fusion techniques for aggregating multiple observations refer-
ring to an observed stationary value, i.e. one that does not change during the crowd-
sourcing process. This corresponds to the requirement 1 and examples of problems in
such settings include crowdsourcing of the position of a radio mast (see Chapter 3 for
more details) or the location of a person trapped in a damaged building. Now, as part of
our requirement 2, we also need to extend our discussion to crowdsourcing problems in
which the observed value changes dynamically as a function of the input. In particular,
we focus crowdsourcing spatial functions that is relevant for a number of applications in
disaster response including, for example, mapping the spreading of a contageous disease,
estimating a temperature map, a weather map or a radioactivity map. In such settings,
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untrustworthy observations are also problematic as they can lead to wrong predictions
in the same way that we discussed for the stationary value case in Section 2.3.1. How-
ever, the spatial correlation in the data changes the inference significantly. To deal with
this case, we now look at the class of learning techniques for spatial regression, partic-
ularly seeking flexible models of practical applicability to large-scale problems. While a
number of regression techniques are available, ranging from least square regression and
polynomial regression, to neural networks and kernel methods, there is typically a trade-
off between the expressiveness of such models and their analytical tractability (Bishop,
2006). In this space, we identify Gaussian process regression as a rare exception of a
model that is analytically tractable and at the same time a very flexible. This model is
particularly suitable for our problem. Thus, we describe it in the next section.
2.4.1 Gaussian Process Spatial Regression
The Gaussian process (GP) is a Bayesian non-parametric model widely used for spatial
and temporal regression in many real-world applications (Rasmussen, 2004). Specifically,
in a spatial regression task, we are given a dataset of n geo-located observations of an
unknown spatial function f(x), where an observation normally consists of a pair of
geographical locations (latitude and longitude) and output values, i.e. D = {xi ∈
R2, yi ∈ R : i = 1, . . . , n}, and the objective is to determine f(x) from the data.
Furthermore, Gaussian process regression assumes that the distribution of any subset of
such observations is jointly Gaussian and that yi is a noisy measurement, with zero-mean
Gaussian noise, of the actual value of the function y˜i at the location xi. Formally:
yi = y˜i + , y˜i = f(xi),  ∼ N (0, σn) (2.13)
In more detail, to make Bayesian inference in the function space, the GP model intro-
duces a prior over the function f defined by a mean function m(x) = E[f(x)] and a
covariance function K(x,x′) = cov(x,x′). Thus, the GP is completely specified as:
f(x) ∼ GP(m(x),K(x,x′)) (2.14)
Specifically, the mean function represents the default value of f in the regions where no
correlated training points are available (and it is often conventionally taken to be zero
for notational simplicity). Instead, the covariance function is a crucial element in a GP
predictor and needs to be appropriately chosen for a specific dataset. In particular, the
covariance function is typically a stationary function that only depends on the distance
between x and x′, and it has some free parameters called the hyperparameters. For
example, the squared-exponential is a stationary function generally used for a GP, with
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two hyperparameters that are the signal variance σf and the length scale l. That is:
K(x,x′) = σf exp
(
− 1
2l2
(x− x′)2
)
(2.15)
Then, if we wish to predict the value of f at a new test location x∗ from the data, and
let such a value be y∗, then, assuming that y and y∗ are Gaussian random vectors, we
can write the joint distribution at the test location as:[
y
y∗
]
∼ N
(
m(x),
[
K(x,x) + σn K(x,x∗)
K(x∗,x) K(x∗,x∗)
])
(2.16)
Now, conditioning y∗ on y and using the marginalisation properties of the Gaussian
distribution, we can derive the key equations of the predictive distribution for Gaussian
process regression as follows:
p(y∗|x, y,x∗) = N (E[y∗], σ2(y∗)) (2.17)
where
E[y∗] = m(x) +K(x∗,x)[K(x,x) + σ2n]
−1y (2.18)
σ2(y∗) = K(x∗,x∗)−K(x∗,x)[K(x,x) + σ2n]−1K(x,x∗) (2.19)
Specifically, Equations 2.18 and 2.19 denote the predictive distribution of f(x∗) given
by the predictive mean value and the predictive variance that is particularly suitable
for the estimating the predictive uncertainty as outlined in requirement 2. Also, by
integrating the likelihood, p(y|x) = N (f, σn), over the GP prior (Equation 2.13), then
we can obtain the analytical equation of marginal likelihood (typically expressed as the
log-likelihood that is a monotonically increasing function and simplifies the notation)
which is useful to train the hyperparameters (Rasmussen, 2004):
log p(f |x, θ) =− 1
2
yT [K(x,x) + σn]
−1y
− 1
2
log|K(x,x) + σn| − n
2
log(2pi) (2.20)
Specifically, such a GPR predictive distribution is derived with a process noise  having
a constant variance σn. That is, in practice, all the observations reported by the users
have the same level of noise, which in statistics is referred to as homoscedastic regression
(Silverman, 1985). However, as part of requirement 4, we require that each observation
has an independent noise level and, to address this, we now introduce the heteroscedastic
variant of Gaussian process regression where the inputs have independent noise terms.
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2.4.2 Input-Dependent Noise
In heteroscedastic regression, the noise of the process varies across the inputs and the
model is formally described as follows:
yi = f(xi) + i (2.21)
Then, if we assume that such noise terms are independent and normally distributed, we
get the same model studied by Goldberg et al. (1997), that is:
i ∼ N (0, σ2(xi)) (2.22)
and defining Σx = diag{σ2(xi)}, then the predictive distribution for such a model is:
E[y∗] = m(x) +K(x∗,x)[K(x,x) + Σx]−1y (2.23)
σ2(y∗) = K(x∗,x∗)−K(x∗,x)[K(x,x) + Σx]−1K(x,x∗) (2.24)
In general, in heteroscedastic Gaussian process (HGP) regression, inference is more
challenging because the function of the noise rates, σ2, is typically unknown. Thus,
a common approach is to use a second GP prior over the noise function σ2, with the
drawback that this makes the model analytically intractable. For this reason, a signif-
icant amount of research has focussed on approximating inference in HPG regression,
particularly using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) (Goldberg et al., 1997), EM-like
procedures (Kersting et al., 2007) and variational Bayes approximation (La´zaro-Gredilla
and Titsias, 2011). Still, for our problem, there are two key observations that greatly
simplify our analysis. Firstly, the noise rates of the individual observations are known
since they are part of the user’s report (Requirement 5). Secondly, it is reasonable to
assume that such noise rates are reported independently by the users, thus there is no
correlation between the noise terms that needs to be smoothed with a second GP. Given
these assumptions, the HGP model can be applied to our problem and its predictive
distribution described by Equations 2.22 and 2.23 can be used for making predictions
of the unknown spatial function. However, the limitation of the current model is that
it does not consider the individual trustworthiness of the reports presenting the same
issue discussed earlier for the CI method (Section 3.1.2). Therefore, in Chapter 5, we
will detail our novel trust-based HGP the considers also the trustworthiness dimension
of each input.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter we introduced the key notions within the literature for dealing with
untrustworthy information in crowdsourcing situations. Specifically, we began by dis-
cussing the computational approaches to trust evaluation and we identified the consensus
approach as a suitable basis for our problem. In particular, we highlighted its property
of effectively dealing with redundant datasets that are typical of a crowdsourcing prob-
lem. However, the standard consensus methods need to be extended to be applicable to
datasets of observations with reported uncertainties and, to this end, in Chapter 3 we
will introduce a novel consensus technique that addresses this limitation.
Then, reviewing approaches to reliable crowdsourcing, we discarded the gold-based ap-
proach as it is based on gold standards (available ground truths) which are not part of
our requirements. However, the machine learning approach was identified as more suit-
able and various learning models for crowdsourcing problems based on graphical models
were discussed in Section 2.2.2. Unfortunately, none of these models fully meet our
requirements as, in particular, they only deal with datasets of pointwise observations.
To address this limitation, we sought alternative learning techniques for aggregating
estimates within the sub-field of data fusion.
Reviewing data fusion models, we first highlighted the key differences between the tra-
ditional fusion approach for sensor data and the required fusion approach for human
data, pointing out the fact that the former is not appropriately designed for modelling
human-like sensor behaviour. Then, we discussed two standard techniques for the single-
hypothesis and the multi-hypothesis fusion case, namely covariance intersection (CI) and
covariance union (CU). In this context, the CI method is good basis for dealing with
noise reduction in fused estimates, however it needs to be extended to consider the in-
dividual trustworthiness of a report to meet our requirement 3. Therefore, for our new
trust-based fusion method in Chapter 3, we will design a variant of the CI method where
the estimates are fused according to their level of trustworthiness. Furthermore, the CU
method was identified as the conservative solution for a fusion problem for its property
of being an aggregator with guaranteed consistency but also with low informativeness
due to its inflated variance. Therefore, CU will only be referred to as a benchmark of
conservative fusion in our approach.
Furthermore, the outlier detection approach was discussed as a possible methodology to
identify untrustworthy reports and the LOF method of density-based outlier detection
was introduced. This method is sentitive to the choice of the the outlier threshold t
and the parameter k that defines the locality region of outlier search. Therefore, we will
also use this method as a benchmark and compare it to our trustworthiness estimation
approach in terms of performance and flexibility.
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Subsequently, we described an algorithm derived by the model presented by Reece et al.
(2009), for untrustworthy sensors in multi-sensor fusion. This algorithm was judged as
a solution that could potentially meet our requirements, although its underlying model
is natively defined for a sensor fusion problem rather than for a crowdsourcing one.
Therefore, we intend to evaluate this algorithm in a crowdsourcing context by using it
as the main benchmark for our approach.
Finally, we discussed the problem of dealing with crowdsourced spatial functions that is
part of our requirement. To this end, we reviewed techniques for heteroscedastic spatial
regression. In particular, we introduced Gaussian process spatial regression with input-
dependent noise which was identified as a valid technique for our problem’s requirements.
However, its limitation is that it does not provide any support against untrustworthy
observations. Thus, we will address this shortcoming by detailing a new trust-based
HGP model for untrustworthy inputs in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3
A Trust-Based Fusion Model for
Crowdsourced Location Reports
In this chapter, we present and evaluate our trust-based fusion model for crowdsourcing
location reports which directly addresses the requirement of crowdsourcing a stationary
value with untrustworthy information (requirement 1). Specifically, in this space, we
look at the problem of crowdsourcing a location target which is relevant for a number of
industry and disaster response applications including cell tower localisation and finding
missing or trapped person. Specifically, in this problem, the objective is to localise a
target placed at undisclosed location from a set of possibly untrustworthy reports.
To address this problem, Section 4.1 will define a crowd reporting model for GPS location
estimates reported by multiple untrustworthy users. In particular, the salient feature
of such a model is to deal with the unknown reliability of the reports through formally
modelling the trustworthiness of the user, so addressing the requirement of considering
trustworthiness in the crowdsourcing inference model (requirement 5). Subsequently, a
user’s trustworthiness can be incorporated into the data fusion method to estimate the
predictive distribution of the target location.
In more detail, we will define a novel trust-based fusion rule which builds upon the co-
variance intersection rule discussed Section 2.3.1 extended to incorporate the knowledge
of user trustworthiness in the fused estimate. Based on such a rule, we will then derive a
maximum likelihood estimator for the trustworthiness parameters which also provides,
in turns, an estimate of the fused output. Subsequently, as a key contribution of this
work, Section 3.2 will detail an algorithm, called MaxTrust, that implements the numer-
ical optimisation of the likelihood to jointly estimate the trustworthiness parameters, so
fulfilling the requirement 5, and the target location, so fulfilling the requirement 1.
Then, Section 4.3 will empirically evaluate the performance of MaxTrust against a num-
ber of trust-based and non-trust methods that were discussed in the previous chapter. In
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a typical crowd reporting scenario with a user observing a
target and reporting its observed location through its GPS-enabled smart phone.
particular, we will evaluate MaxTrust on synthetic data analysing the properties of the
algorithm in various simulated crowd reporting settings. Then, we will show that Max-
Trust can work also in real settings with an experiment on real-world data. Specifically,
we identify the application of crowdsourced mast localisation as a suitable benchmark
for a stationary value crowdsourcing problem, where the observed stationary value is
the position of the mast that needs to be determined from multiple crowdsourced cell
detections. This experiment involves a real crowdsourced dataset of cell detections pro-
vided by the OpenSignalMaps project. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes the chapter with
a summary of the results.
3.1 Model Description
In this section, we formally describe our crowd reporting model (Section 3.1.1). Then,
we detail the procedure for computing the fused estimate (Section 3.1.2) and estimating
the trustworthiness parameters (Section 3.1.3).
3.1.1 A Trust Model for Crowdsourced Location Reports
In this model, a crowd of n users U = {1, . . . n} observe a target placed at an undisclosed
location x0,∈ R2, where a location is specified by the pair of the geographical latitude
and longitude value (although an analogous model description could be provided for
an observed d-dimensional target). Each user i reports one location estimate ri of the
target obtained through the GPS sensor of its phone, with such an estimate comprising
the following two values: (i) the GPS position xi ∈ R2 and (ii) the precision of the
GPS fix: θi ∈ [LB ,UB ] where 0 < LB < UB < +∞, with θi that is automatically
provided by the GPS receiver itself (estimated on the basis of the number and geometry
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of satellites being used to generate the fix, see Android (developer.android.com) and
Apple (developer.apple.com) API for more details). In this case, each report ri =
〈xi, θi〉 means that user i estimates x0 as xi with precision θi. and the objective is
to estimate x0 from the set of reports. For example, Figure 3.1 illustrates a typical
scenario described by our model. Specifically, there is a crowd that observes a specific
target, that is this case is represented by a “red ballon” inspired the red ballon DARPA
challenge.1 Each user reports GPS estimates of the balloon location using a mobile app
designed for submitting such reports. Then, the collected reports can be represented on
map as estimates (circles) of where the balloon could be located based on the reported
GPS location and the GPS precision.
Formally, we represent the uncertainty of a user’s reported location as a probability
density function (PDF) over the two-dimensional search space. Specifically, given ri, we
assume that the probability density at a generic point x ∈ R2 is normally distributed:
p(x|ri) = N (x|xi, θiI) =
√
θi
2pi
exp
(
−θi||x− xi||
2
2
)
(3.1)
where the precision matrix θiI, with I = 2 × 2, denotes an uncorrelated and equally
distributed variance along the two latitude and longitude dimensions. In statistics,
this setting is also referred to as heteroscedatic inference where a collection of random
variables has different variabilities quantified by the individual noise terms (see Section
2.5 for more details).
Then, we consider each user i as having an individual level of trustworthiness determined
by the quality of its estimates. More formally, we assume that a report ri is trustworthy
with respect to x0 if the following condition holds:
xi ∼ N (x|x0, θiI) (3.2)
That is, xi is drawn from a normal distribution centred on the actual target location
with noise proportional to the user’s precision. Conversely, ri is untrustworthy with
respect to x0 if xi is drawn from any other statistics that differs from the one above.
For example, a typical case of an untrustworthy report is when xi is drawn from a biased
distribution N (x|x0 ± b, θiI) where the mean is shifted from x0 with a random bias b.
To capture such user trustworthiness, we introduce a set of trustworthiness parameters
t = 〈ti . . . tn〉T where ti ∈ [0, 1] denotes the trustworthiness of user i (1 if i is fully
trustworthy, 0 if i is untrustworthy). Accordingly, we express the new probability density
1This challenge aimed to find 10 red balloons in the US using crowdsourcing and social media and it
was won by a MIT team in less than nine hours (archive.darpa.mil).
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Figure 3.2: Effect of the trustworthiness parameter on a Gaussian estimate.
of an untrustworthy estimate ri as a Gaussian PDF defined as follows:
p(x|ri, ti) = N (x|xi, tiθiI) =
√
tiθi
2pi
exp
(
− tiθi||x− xi||
2
2
)
(3.3)
That is, similarly to Snelson and Ghahramani (2006), we use ti as a scaling parameter of
the precision of the Gaussian estimate. In such a way, the uncertainty of an estimate is
regulated by the trustworthiness parameter, i.e. if a report is fully trustworthy (ti = 1)
then the uncertainty of its estimate is equal to the reported precision. Otherwise, if
a report is untrustworthy (ti  1) then the uncertainty will increase to the extent of
having an approximately uniform density across any x ∈ R2 as ti tends to 0. In more
detail, such a scaling effect of uncertainty is shown in Figure 3.2 where a one-dimensional
Gaussian estimate, r = 〈16, 3〉 is plotted for different values of trustworthiness, ti =
{1, 0.5, 0.2}. From this, we can see that the PDF flattens on the x-axis as a consequence
of inflating its variance proportionally to ti thus producing the effect of de-emphasizing
an untrustworthy estimate that we require.
3.1.2 Trust-based Fusion Model
As our ultimate objective is to convert the crowd’s reports into a global estimate of
the observed target location, we now require a method to fuse the reports that takes
into account the individual level of trustworthiness of each participant (requirement 5).
To this end, drawing from the realm of the data fusion methods discussed in Section
2.5, we consider this problem as a single-hypothesis fusion problem that we detailed in
Section 2.5. This assumption is motivated by the fact that since the observed target
is stationary then all the reports are assumed to refer to only one hypothesis of its
correct value. As such, we use the covariance intersection (CI) rule, that is the standard
method for single-hypothesis fusion problems, as the baseline technique for computing
the aggregated output in our model. Specifically, given a set of untrustworthy reports
R = {r1, . . . , rn}, with associated trustworthiness t, then their CI fusion is a new PDF
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Figure 3.3: Example of 10 Gaussians fused through the standard fusion (a) and
trust-based fusion (b).
f(x|R, t), formally defined as follows:
f(x|R, t) = N (x|xf , θf I) (3.4)
θf = t
Tθ (3.5)
xf = θ
−1
f (tX
Tθ) (3.6)
where X is the matrix with xi as row vectors and θ = 〈θ1, . . . θn〉T is the precision vector.
For the two-dimensional case, the equations above can also be rewritten as follows:
θf = t1θ1 + · · ·+ tnθn (3.7)
xf,1 = θ
−1
f (x1,1t1θ1 + · · ·+ xn,1tnθn) (3.8)
xf,2 = θ
−1
f (x1,2t1θ1 + · · ·+ xn,2tnθn) (3.9)
where xi = 〈xi,1, xi,2〉 and xf = 〈xf,1, xf,2〉. Specifically, CI applied to our trust model
defines a new trust-based fusion model in which each estimate is fused as jointly weighted
by θi and by ti. This determines that more trustworthy reports are considered with a
higher degree, while the untrustworthy ones are gradually downgraded in the fusion. In
so doing, such trust-based fusion incorporates the knowledge of report trustworthiness
in the fused output and deviates from the traditional CI fusion which considers all the
estimates as equally trustworthy. Furthermore, comparing these two fusion approaches,
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a set of 10 one-dimensional Gaussians, referring to a
target placed in position x0 = 8 (blue bar), that are fused through CI (Figure 3.3, (a))
and through the trust-based fusion described above (Figure 3.3 (b)). Specifically, in
this example the trustworthiness values are set to t1:7 = 1 and t8:10 = 0 to denote that
the last two estimates are believed to be untrustworthy. As an effect, it can be noticed
that the trust-based estimate is much closer to x0 compared to the estimate of the
non-trust method as the former assigns lower weights to the reports r9 and r10 that are
indeed inconsistent with x0. More generally, our trust-based fusion model is designed
in such a way that its estimation accuracy is related to the correct assignment of the
trustworthiness parameters.
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Figure 3.4: Likelihood of three reports r1, r2, r3 over the fused estimate f .
3.1.3 A Maximum Likelihood Trustworthiness Estimator
We now describe a computational approach to estimate the trustworthiness parameters
of each user using the maximum likelihood estimator. In particular, maximum likelihood
is the widely used frequentist estimation approach which sets the parameters in statistical
model to the values that maximise the probability of the observed dataset (likelihood)
(Bishop, 2006). Therefore, we start by defining the likelihood of the trustworthiness
of a single report as follows. For each report ri, considering for notational simplicity
that the two-dimensional vectors can also be written as x = 〈x1, x2〉, xi = 〈xi,1, xi,2〉
and xf = 〈xf,1, xf,2〉 respectively, then the likelihood of ti given ri and f(x|R, t) is the
joint product of the two PDFs described in Equation 3.3 and 3.4, integrated over the
two-dimensional space. Formally:
L(ti|ri, f) =
∫
R2
p(x|ri, ti)f(x|R, t)dx
=
∫
x1
∫
x2
tiθiθf
4pi2
exp
(
− 1
2
(tiθi(x1 − xi,2)2
+ tiθi(x2 − xi,2)2 + θf (x1 − xf,1)2
+ θf (x2 − xf,2)2
)
dx1dx2 (3.10)
Then, applying basic rules of Gaussian integration, Equation 3.4 can be solved in closed
form as follows:
L(ti|ri, f) = 1
2pi( 1tiθi +
1
θf
)
exp
(
− tiθi
2
(xi,1 + xi,2)
2
+
(tiθixi,1 + θfxf,1)
2 + (tiθixi,2 + θfxf,2)
2
2(tiθi + θf )
− θf
2
(xf,1 + yf,2)
2
)
(3.11)
That is, such a likelihood of ti is taken as the product of the probabilities assigned by
ri and f to the area of ∆x, then taking the limit ∆x → 0, and summing up for each
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possible ∆x, this gives the integral over x. Such an integral is equal to the exponential
of the pairwise distance between x and xi and between xi and xf , scaled by tiθi and
θf respectively. In more detail, a numerical example of computing the likelihood of a
report is provided in Figure 3.4, where the likelihood of ti = 1 is computed for three
reports, r1 = 〈7, 0.7〉, r2 = 〈9, 0.25〉, r3 = 〈12, 0.11〉 and f = 〈5, 1〉. In particular, it can
be seen that the likelihood value is proportional to the area shared between ri and f
i.e. the further is, ri from f , the lower is its likelihood and, in this example r1 and r3
are the most and least likely estimate respectively, given f .
Next, assuming independence between ti and tj for any i 6= j, equivalent to saying that
each user’s trustworthiness is independent from any other user, the global likelihood of
t given R is the product of the individual likelihood terms. Formally:
L(t|R) =
n∏
i=1
L(ti|ri, f)
=
n∏
i=1
(∫
R2
p(x|ri, ti)f(x|R, t)dx
)
(3.12)
Notice that the function above does not directly depend on f as this is implicitly derived
from R and t which are already function parameters (see Equation 3.4). Then, by taking
the log-likelihood of Equation 3.12 we obtain the following expression:
ln
(
L(t|R)) = n∑
i=1
ln
(
L(ti|ri, f)
)
=− n ln(2pi) +
k∑
i=1
(
ln(tiθi + θf ) + ln(tiθiθf )
+
(xi,1tiθi + xf,1θf )
2 + (xi,2tiθi + xf,2θf )
2
2(tiθi + θf )
− tiθi
2
(xi,1 + xi,2)
2 − θf
2
(xf,1 + xf,2)
2
)
(3.13)
Finally, factoring in the expressions of θf and xf (Equations 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9), then we
get the final likelihood function (omitted here for simplicity) that we maximise to find
the maximum likelihood values of the trustworthiness parameters, formally:
tML = arg max
t
n∑
i=1
ln
(
L(ti|ri, f)
)
(3.14)
In so doing, we notice that there are two singularities in the function for ti = −θf/θi
and ti = 0 (see Equation 3.13). We discuss these two cases individually. Specifically, the
case of ti = −θf/θi is excluded by our initial assumptions of having θi and ti positively
defined (see, Section 3.1.1). The case of ti = 0 implies that the trustworthiness value
of any report cannot be set to zero otherwise this would give an infinite variance which
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is not tractable numerically. To avoid this, we set the range of ti to be open in 0,
i.e. ti ∈ (0, 1], thus approximating the value of an untrustworthy report with a small
value , i.e. ti ∈ [, 1]. Having now described our model formally, an algorithm for
computationally optimising the likelihood to estimate the parameters is provided in the
next section.
3.2 The MaxTrust Algorithm
This section describes the algorithm, called MaxTrust, for computing the trustworthiness
parameters and the fused estimate in our model implementing the maximal likelihood
estimator formally described in the previous section. Such an algorithm is designed
in a way to trade-off a good quality in the numerical approximation with polynomial
complexity.
Before going into further detail, however, we discuss the following two computational
issues concerning the analysis of our model. First, the non-linear expression of the
likelihood described in Equation 3.13 is not tractable analytically. Thus, we need to
use numerical optimisation to carry out such a function maximisation. Second, there
is a mutual dependency between the trustworthiness parameters, i.e. when we update
ti also we do need to update the remaining t(−i) parameters. Thus, a natural way
to solve this computationally is to iteratively set values of each of the ti parameters
until these converge. Specifically, to do this, we use the Jacobi iteration (Hageman and
Young, 2004), which is a standard numerical technique for solving non-linear systems
that sequentially update only one system parameter at a time using the values of the
previous iteration2. Drawing these two points together, our MaxTrust algorithm can
now be described (see Algorithm 3.1).
In more detail, in step 1, the algorithm initially sets ti uniformly to 1, i.e. it is conser-
vative in considering all reports as trustworthy in the first iteration. Then, steps 3-6
implement the Jacobi iteration where, at the h-th iteration, t
(h)
i is updated through the
pointwise maximisation of f with only ti left as a free parameter using the values of
t
(h−1)
−i from the previous iteration (step 5). After convergence is achieved, and such a
convergence was empirically found to be reached in approximately 5 - 20 iterations, then
the algorithm returns the trustworthiness values t(h) and the fusion parameters 〈xf , θf 〉
from the last iteration (step 7-8). Thus, MaxTrust computes the output in O(|S||T |)
polynomial time, where |T | is the number of trustworthiness parameters and |S| is the
number of samples used to perform the pointwise function maximisation in step 5. In
contrast, an exhaustive numerical function maximisation would require O(|S||T |) that is
exponential time to try all the possible combinations of the |S| samples for each of the
2The dual method, the Gauss-Seidel iteration (Black and Moore, 2006), is also suitable although this
was found to be less numerically stable in our experiments.
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Algorithm 3 MaxTrust
Variables :
R : Report set.
t(h) : Trustworthiness vector at the h-th learning epoch.
f : Fused estimate.
err : Error bound.
epochs : Maximum number of learning epochs.
Algorithm MaxTrust(R)
1: Start with uniform prior trustworthiness:
t(0) := 〈1, . . . , 1〉
2: h := 0
3: while ( |t(h−1) − t(h)| < err and h < epochs ) do
4: h := h+ 1
5: for i := 1 : k do
t
(h)
i := arg maxt L(〈t, t(h−1)−i 〉|R) (Eq. 3.13)
end for
6: end while
7: θf := (t(h))T θ,
xf := θ
−1
f (t
(h)XT θ) (Eq. 3.4 - 3.6)
8: return (t(h),xf , θf )
ti parameters. From this, the saving in complexity of MaxTrust in computing such a
function optimisation is readily apparent.
Having now described our algorithm, its empirical evaluation is detailed in the next
section.
3.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of the evaluation of MaxTrust on a target lo-
calisation problem with both synthetic and real-world data. Specifically, the first ex-
periment on synthetic data aims to analyse the properties of the algorithm in various
simulated crowd reporting settings (Section 3.3.1). Then, the second experiment shows
the effectiveness of MaxTrust on the real-world crowdsourcing application of cell tower
localisation (Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Experiment on Synthetic Data
In this first experiment we evaluate MaxTrust on a target localisation problem using
synthetic, one-dimensional data. Specifically, the experimental setting is as follows. A
target is placed in position x0 = 8 and 50 univariate Gaussians are randomly gener-
ated by first sampling θi ∼ U [0.2, 10] and then sampling xi ∼ N (x0, θi), particularly
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following our model assumptions made in Section 4.1. Furthermore, a percentage ρ of
such estimates is untrustworthy. Specifically, an untrustworthy estimate is generated by
adding a random noise w to xi as follows:
xˆi = xi + w where w =
{
∼ U [2, 10] with probability 0.5 for each run
∼ U [−10,−2] otherwise
(3.15)
In particular, as Equation 3.15 states, for a single run of the simulation, w is randomly
sampled from either a positive or a negative range. We do so as to get an unbiased
setting for testing the algorithm. In fact, by sampling w uniformly from [2, 10], we
avoid the situation in which two untrustworthy estimates could be symmetric, with +w
and −w respectively, and so balance their noise in the linear fusion. However, in so
doing, our results would be susceptible to any algorithm that biases the result in one
particular direction. To rectify this, we alternate sampling with probability 0.5 between
the intervals [2, 10] and [−10,−2] for each run. In this way, we avoid the symmetric
noise case but we also consider positive and negative noises.
Given this setting, we benchmark MaxTrust against two classes of fusion algorithms
that are described as follows:
• Non-Trust Fusion Algorithms: These are the fusion algorithms that do not
explicitly consider report trustworthiness. In this class, we consider the follow-
ing three algorithms that are representative of the fusion approaches discussed in
Chapter 2:
– CI: The standard CI fusion rule as described in Section 2.2.
– CU: The covariance union rule (CU) that merges the estimates by taking the
union of their covariances as described in Section 2.2.
– Local Outlier Factor Fusion (LOF): This algorithm is based on the
density-based outlier detection method that was described in Section 2.2.
Specifically, the algorithm first removes outliers identified as the estimates
with LOF greater than 1 (using k = 5 as the number of nearest neighbours),
and then applies CI to fuse the remaining inliers.
• Trust-Based Fusion Algorithms: These are algorithms that consider a report’s
trustworthiness in their fusion process similarly to our approach. Specifically, in
this class, we consider the following two algorithms:
– Optimal CI (OptTrust): This is a hypothetical optimal algorithm with
full knowledge of the trustworthiness value of the single report. That is,
the subset of the untrustworthy reports within R is known and is assigned
with zero trustworthiness. As such, this algorithm represents the optimal
performance for a fusion algorithm in our model.
Chapter 3 A Trust-Based Fusion Model for Crowdsourced Location Reports 39
10 20 30 40 50 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
% Untrustworthy reports (ρ)
RM
SE
CI
CU
RM
MaxTrust
LOF
OptTrust
(a)
10 20 30 40 50 60
100
101
% Untrustworthy reports (ρ)
NM
SE
(b)
Figure 3.5: Plot of the RMSE and the NMSE for the six algorithms against increasing
untrustworthiness.
– Reece Method (RM): This is the algorithm presented by Reece et al. (2009)
for fusing sensor data using sensor trustworthiness described in Algorithm 2.1.
In particular, we run the algorithm setting β = 3 as the authors suggest in
the paper.
In summary, a set of six algorithms {CI, CU, LOF, OptTrust, RM, MaxTrust} were
tested, representing the non-trust versus the trust approach. The accuracy of a predictor
over the N simulations was measured as the root mean square error (RSME) with respect
to x0. That is:
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xif − x0)2 (3.16)
where 〈xif , θif 〉 are the parameters of the predictive estimate produced at the i-th run.
We also consider the normalised mean square error (NMSE) as a more comprehensive
accuracy measurement that considers also the uncertainty of a prediction. That is:
NMSE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
θif (x
i
f − x0)2 (3.17)
Finally, for RM and MaxTrust, we are also interested in measuring the error of their
trustworthiness estimates to evaluate the quality of their learning. To this end, we
consider the RMSE of the trustworthiness parameters defined given by:
t error =
√√√√ 1
|R|
|R|∑
i=1
(tˆi − ti)2 (3.18)
where tˆi is the true value of trustworthiness assigned by the simulator to ri. The results
of this experiment are presented in the next section.
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Results
Figure 3.5 shows the results obtained by each algorithm for N = 600 runs with a
percentage of untrustworthy reports increasingly set to ρ = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60} (the
error bars are invisible due to their very small values). Specifically, Figure 3.5 (a)) shows
that, as expected, the estimation error of all the algorithms increases as ρ increases.
However, OptTrust constantly keeps its error to approximately zero due to the prior
knowledge of the untrustworthy estimates. Amongst the other methods, CU constantly
gets the highest error because of its property of unify the estimates under the most
general output which typically estimates the target inaccurately with respect to x0.
LOF’s error marginally improves over CI as an effect of removing outliers from the
report set, while CI always considers all the reports as inliers. Then, for ρ = 60% every
algorithm achieves a comparable error due to the majority of the reports no longer
converging to the ground truth.
Crucially, we notice that the trust-based fusion algorithms (OptTrust, MaxTrust and
RM) do significantly better than the non-trust algorithms (CI, CU). Moreover, among
these, MaxTrust gets the lowest error and it gains up to 51% compared to RM when
ρ = 40% (a paired-sample t-test revealed that this result is statistically significant at the
0.01 level, t(289.71) = 0.183, p = 1.6 ·10−3). The performance of these two algorithms is
explained by their trustworthiness estimation error that is reported in Table 3.1. From
this, we can see that MaxTrust’s t error is 59% lower than RM for tˆi = 1 (0.31 vs 0.67)
and is comparable for tˆi = 0, (this result was also found to be statistically significant by
a paired t-test at the 0.01 level, t(71.48) = 5.12, p = 2.3 · 10−6).
Another interesting result is the NMSE showed in Figure 3.5 (b) that highlights the
consistency of the estimates of each algorithm. Here, we can see that the normalised
error of MaxTrust, as well as the one of RM, is the closest to the optimum (OptTrust)
with a value of approximately 1 for ρ < 30% that means that the actual target is only one
standard deviation away from the estimated point. Furthermore, the only exception to
the results of these two method is CU whose error is always zero due its high uncertainty.
Thus, this shows that our algorithm is not only accurate, but it is also very informative
with a low predictive uncertainty.
From these results, we contend that the trust-based approach significantly improves the
accuracy of localising the target based on synthetic data. In particular, MaxTrust is
the algorithm with the best trade-off of good accuracy and low uncertainty amongst the
tested methods, and with the additional property of yielding the most accurate learning
of trustworthiness. As the next step, we explore the effectiveness of MaxTrust on a
real-world dataset.
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RM MaxTrust
t error for trustworthy estimates (tˆi = 1) 0.67± 0.15 0.31± 0.10
t error for untrustworthy estimates (tˆi = 0) 0.26± 0.20 0.24± 0.11
Average 0.46± 0.27 0.28± 0.11
Table 3.1: The trustworthiness estimation error (t error) for RM and MaxTrust.
3.3.2 Experiment on Real-World Data
In this second experiment, we focus on the problem of localising cellular masts from
crowdsourced cell detections. This is a key application for the mobile phone industry
(Ahern et al., 2006). In fact, all the major phone manufacturers, including Apple, Google
and Nokia, are engaged in the effort of mapping cellular masts to improve the positioning
system of their mobile phones. Specifically, by having a map of the masts located in the
phone’s local area, then triangulation can rapidly give an accurate phone position with
minimal battery drain. In this way, phones would no longer be constrained to use the
GPS, which is slow (up to 3 minutes to get the signal) and has a high battery depletion.
Moreover, cell towers positioning would allow them to localise themselves also in indoor
environments.
However, the task of mapping the masts cannot be easily achieved manually since the
topology of cellular networks may change frequently and the network operators do not
always make available the map of their installed masts in every country. For this reason,
a number of projects have recently explored a crowdsourcing approach to this problem
consisting of leveraging the multitude of mobile phones disseminated across the cell to
collect data about mast locations.3 Specifically, GPS-equipped phones can provide the
list of the masts scanned in their surrounding area together with the phone’s current
GPS position. Then, the mast location can be determined through merging multiple
cell detections reported by the phones from different positions.
However, in so doing, an important issue to consider is the untrustworthiness of some
of the reported cell detections. Specifically, GPS readings are often inaccurate, mainly
because of the limited update frequency of the device that often returns out-of-date lo-
cations. Also, the signal strength read by the phone does not always accurately indicate
the current phone-mast distance as the signal may change dynamically across the cell
due to obstacles and reflections. As such, inaccuracies are an issue to reliably localise
the masts. We now show how the MaxTrust algorithm can be applied to this problem
to improve localisation accuracy through estimating the trustworthiness of a reported
detection. Specifically, we focus on the case of an omni-directional cell tower network
illustrated in Figure 3.6, namely where a mast is placed at the centre of each hexagonal
cell. We do so as in such network topologies the probability of cell detections is spheri-
cally uniformly distributed since, the mast radiates the signal spherically across the cell.
3For examples, see cellmapper.net, epitiro.com and skyhookwireless.com
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Figure 3.6: Topology of a cellular network with omni-directional radio masts.
Thus, this case better represents the assumption of normally distributed probability of
the mast location given an observation made by our model in Section 3.1.1.
Dataset
In this experiment, we used the dataset provided by the OpenSignalMaps project
(opensignalmaps.com) that includes 1563 records of anonymised mobile phones that
reported detections for a set of 129 omni-directional cellular masts (max=46, min=6,
avg=12 reports per masts) in the area of Southampton, UK (bounding box: 50.97
N, 1.525 W and 50.85 N, 1.25 W). Specifically, each report comprises (i) the Cell ID
(CID) and Location Area Code (LAC) of the phone’s cell, (ii) the GPS location of the
phone (latitude and longitude degrees), (iii) the precision of the GPS fix (in meters).
However, for privacy issues, the dataset did not provide any user identifier that could
link between the single user and its multiple reports. Therefore, in this experiment,
we can only consider the single-reporting case in which each user is assumed to report
only one cell detection, A complete description of the dataset is provided in Appendix
A. Furthermore, a second official dataset of mast locations is made available by the
Authority of UK Communication (OFCOM, ofcom.org.uk) which we consider as a
more reliable dataset for this experiment. Therefore, we will refer to the OFFCOM
dataset as the ground truth for evaluating our algorithm. Then, to define a setting for
such a dataset suitable for applying our model, each geographical position (latitude-
longitude value) is converted into planar coordinates (in meters) applying the following
projection:
RLat-Lon =
(
lat
lon
)
(degrees)
(degrees)
7→ Rx =
(
x1
x2
)
(meters)
(meters)
x1 = 111, 229 · cos(Lat) · (lon− lon0) (3.19)
x2 = 111, 229 · (lat− lat0) (3.20)
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Figure 3.8: Screenshot of the reports
for the cell tower (CID 3139, LAC 22)
from the OpenSignalMap dataset.
where lat0 and lon0 are the coordinates of the point taken as the origin in the new system
(conventionally set to 50.84 N, 1.52 E). In more detail, such a transformation approxi-
mates the more complex Haversine formula that provides the appropriate trigonometric
treatment for spherical distances between two location points but is constrained for
numerical computation (Kells et al., 1951). Instead, given that at 50N one degree of
latitude corresponds to 111,229 meters, the projection described in Equations 3.19 and
3.20 is more efficient to compute the new position for each point with an approximation
error that is small enough for the geographical area that we consider.
Then, to calculate θi, i.e. the precision of a reported detection, we notice that 66%
of the readings were within 1200 meters from the ground truth tower location, as it is
apparent from the cumulative distribution of the phone-mast distance showed in Figure
3.7. Hence, setting σ0 = 1200, then θi is determined as follows:
θi = (σ GPS
2
i + σ
2
0)
−1 (3.21)
where σ GPS2i is the inverse of the GPS precision reported by user i. Summing up, the
estimate associated with each phone’s report is represented as ri = 〈xi,1, xi,2, θi〉, where
〈xi,1, xi,2〉 is the position of the user and θi is the precision of such a position, respectively.
As an example, Figure 3.8 shows the reports collected for the cell (CID 3139, LAC 22)
represented as a two-dimensional normal distribution according to the representation
given above. Specifically, the centre of the circle corresponds to the expected location
and the radius its the 99% confidence interval (i.e. 3/θi).
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Similarly to our previous experiment, we measure the accuracy and the consistency of
the algorithms as the RMSE and the NMSE respectively, formally:
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
|masts|
masts∑
i=1
|xi − xˆi|2 (meters) (3.22)
NMSE =
1
|masts|
masts∑
i=1
θi|xi − xˆi|2 (3.23)
Finally, to demonstrate that our algorithm outperforms other fusion methods, we com-
pare it to the same set of benchmarks described in Section 3.3.1 (excluding OptTrust
which is unfeasible in this case since there is no prior knowledge of report trustworthi-
ness available), that are now adapted to process two-dimensional location data as it is
the case of the OpenSignalMap dataset. The results of this experiment are described in
the next section.
Results
The performance of the five algorithms, CI, CU, LOF, RM, MaxTrust, are reported
in Table 3.2 in terms of the geographical distance (in meters) of the estimated mean
from the ground truth. For brevity, the table reports only the results of 15 out of 129
randomly selected masts but the results for the other masts are similar as is apparent
also from Figure 4.9 (a). In particular, we can see from the table that the estimates
of the masts made by CI and LOF have an error, on average, of approximately 1250
meters from the actual tower location. In contrast, the trust-based methods, RM and
MaxTrust, lower this error by at least 30% that corresponds to an accuracy increase
by approximately 384 meters. In particular, MaxTrust is able to reduce such an error
even further, 21% lower than RM, which is equivalent to an improvement of 200 meters
compared to RM that is globally 600 meters more accurate than CI and LOF.
Furthermore, Figure 4.9 (a) shows the RMSE for the algorithms taken over the whole
set of the 129 masts. From this, we can see that this error is in line with the results on
the smaller set, with MaxtTrust outperforming the other methods by 42% (equivalent
to 467 meters) compared to CI, and by 22% (equivalent to 185 meters) compared to
RM. Interestingly, plotting the error for MaxTrust and CI over the number of reports
available in each cell (Figure 3.10), we notice that MaxTrust minimises its error when
the size of the report set is small (i.e. < 20 reports), while its error is comparable to
CI for larger report sets. This is explained by the fact that, when there are sufficiently
many reports in the cell, then there is likely to be a majority of trustworthy reports that
mitigate the error of the untrustworthy ones. However, in cells where not many reports
are available, than our algorithm can be more accurate in localising the mast. Finally,
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Figure 3.9: Bar plots of the RMSE (a) and NMSE (b) for the five algorithm in
estimating the positions of the 129 masts.
as for the previous results, CU gets the highest error that means that the union estimate
is typically distant from the real mast location.
A final interesting result is the consistency of algorithms, as measured by the NMSE in
Figure 4.9 (b). As before, CU’s error is minimal because of its very high predictive un-
certainty. In particular, the trust-based algorithms, MaxTrust and RM, outperform the
other two non-trust algorithms, CI and LOF, by up 50% compared to LOF. Specifically,
likewise the results from the previous experiment (Section 3.3.1), their mean normalised
error is approximately 2 that means that the location estimated by these two methods is
only two standard deviations away from the actual tower location in the two-dimensional
space. Thus, this confirms that our algorithm is not only accurate, but that it also has
a low predictive uncertainty. From this, we conclude that the trust-based fusion per-
formed by MaxTrust improves the accuracy in solving the mast localisation problem
and additionally learns the trustworthiness of each detection. In particular, MaxTrust
is able to localise the mast with an error that is an average of 181 meters lower than
any other method.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our trust-based fusion model for crowdsourced location
reports as part of addressing requirement 1 for crowdsourcing a stationary location
target. To address this problem, we introduced a trust model of a user reporting location
estimates of an observed fixed target where the trustworthiness of a user is modelled
as a scaling parameter of the reported uncertainty. Based on this, we described a
fusion method for computing global estimates taking into account the individual levels
of trustworthiness of the users.
Then, as part of the contributions of this work detailed in Section 1.3, we presented our
MaxTrust algorithm that, given the report set, estimates the target location through
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Figure 3.10: Error of CI and MaxTrust over the number of reports for each mast.
learning the trustworthiness of each user using the maximum likelihood estimator. In
particular, we showed that MaxTrust outperforms five of the state-of-the-art methods in
accuracy and predictive uncertainty in estimating the target. In more detail, empirical
results on synthetic data showed that our algorithm predicts the target more accurately,
by up to 51% and with lower uncertainty by up to 80%. Furthermore, we showed that
our algorithm can also work in real settings with an experiment on crowdsourced cell
tower localisation using real-world data. In this experiment, MaxTrust improved the
precision of predicting the cell tower location by up 21% compared to the benchmark,
that, on average, corresponds to 185 meters lower localisation error.
However, the current model is limited by the condition that the observed target is a
stationary value which is typically the case for a location target. Furthermore, in the
application of such a model to the OpenSignalMap cell tower dataset, we could only
consider single-reporting by the users since we were not provided with the user identifier
that could link between the user and its multiple reports. To remove these limitations,
and so be able to apply our trust-based approach to a broader range of crowdsourc-
ing problems, the next chapter will introduce a more general trust-based crowdsourcing
model setting for a non-stationary function target, particularly considering crowdsourc-
ing spatial function targets in a multi-reporting. Such a model will also be referred to
the stationary target problem investigated in this chapter as a special case of a constant
value spatial function. We will then apply this model to a more comprehensive real-world
dataset provided with user identifiers which will allows us to consider multiple-reporting.
Chapter 3 A Trust-Based Fusion Model for Crowdsourced Location Reports 47
Tower ID [CID, LAC] CU CI LOF RM MaxTrust
[1687, 608]
1440m 957m 700m 582m 528m
(50.908 N 1.358 W)
[11259544, 109]
1461m 1061m 955m 1020m 924m
(50.907 N, 1.408 W)
[209873204, 3202]
919m 487m 539m 420m 465m
(50.923 N, 1.434 W)
[24155, 122]
1740m 1055m 1177m 959m 985m
(50.909 N, 1.408 W)
[45995383, 217]
1309m 1042m 935m 914m 901m
(50.911 N, 1.447 W)
[62172, 608]
1350m 1368m 301m 1390m 850m
(50.915 N, 1.459 W)
[46005029, 217]
1929m 644m 768m 783m 744m
(50.917 N, 1.287 W)
[4664508, 43582]
1246m 257m 424m 243m 192m
(50.904 N, 1.417 W)
[46195850, 21]
2947m 2767m 3574m 295m 400m
(50.876 N, 1.265 W)
[45995383, 217]
1309m 1042m 935m 914m 901m
(50.911 N, 1.447 W)
[4684349, 43582]
495m 1208m 1071m 1131m 689m
(50.939 N, 1.350 W)
[46195491, 21]
3125m 1593m 1638m 1074m 853m
(50.887 N, 1.291 W)
[11694, 122]
1050m 1159m 938m 1040m 889m
(50.908 N, 1.400 W)
[45988753, 217]
1332m 1468m 259m 812m 268m
(50.900 N, 1.311 W)
[4671127, 43582]
1256m 368m 589m 493m 282m
(50.951 N, 1.382 W)
Average 1673.60m 1243.70m 1253.90m 866.17m 684.43m
Table 3.2: Distance (in meters) from the predictive mean produced by the algorithms
from the ground truth location (reported in brackets) for 15 cell towers.
Chapter 4
A Trust-Based Heteroscedastic
Gaussian Process Model for
Crowdsourcing Spatial Functions
In this chapter, we present our second model that addresses part of the shortcomings
of MaxTrust and extends the generality of our trust approach. Specifically, as discussed
in Section 3.4, MaxTrust suffers from the limitation of assuming that the target ob-
served by the crowd is a stationary value and, as such, observations can be assumed
to be all referring to one single correct value. In particular, this setting is suitable for
applications of crowdsourcing location targets as in the example of crowdsourced cell
tower localisation presented in Section 3.3.2. However, it is of practical interest for many
other crowdsourcing applications to consider the more general setting of crowd report-
ing about a non-stationary quantity. In this context, the typical example is a crowd
observing an environmental process, such as a temperature map, a weather map or a
radiation map. In this case, the spatio-temporal correlation on the collected dataset
makes inference more challenging especially when also the individual trustworthiness of
the reports needs to be considered.
Therefore, we now address the requirement of making inference over a non-stationary
quantity from reported observations (requirement 5) while dealing with the uncertainty
of data trustworthiness which characterises crowdsourced information (requirement 1).
Specifically, as a first step to address this problem, we focus on spatial inference with
crowdsourced data where the objective is to learn an unknown spatial function from a set
of observations reported by untrustworthy users. To tackle this problem, we propose a
new trust-based heteroscedastic Gaussian process (HGP) model that combines the trust
approach underpinning MaxTrust (see Section 3.1.1) in spatial regression. Specifically,
the qualities of this model are to (i) make predictions of an underlying spatial process
from a set of untrustworthy observations (requirement 2), (ii) to consider the reported
48
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uncertainty on the single observation in the inference (requirement 4) and (iii) to provide
estimates of the trustworthiness of the single user (requirement 5).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 formally describes our
trust-based HGP model for untrustworthy location-based observations. Then, Section
4.2 describes the algorithm, called TrustHGP, to compute the predictive distribution
of the observed spatial function under such a model, including user trustworthiness es-
timation. Section 4.3 empirically evaluates TrustHGP using both synthetic data and
real-world data. In particular, the experiment with synthetic data aims to show the
effectiveness of TrustHGP in various simulated settings of untrustworthy crowds. Then,
the second experiment presents a real application of TrustHGP on the key disaster re-
sponse application of crowdsourced radiation monitoring. In particular, this experiment
will involve crowdsourced radiation data from the 2011 Japan’s earthquake used to esti-
mate the radiation map of Japan after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Finally, Section
4.1.2 provides a discussion of the results and concludes.
4.1 Model Description
This section formally describes our trust-based HGP model for spatial regression with
untrustworthy data. First, Section 4.1.1 introduces the trust model of a user in reporting
spatial estimates. Then, 4.1.2 details the HGP model to incorporate such a trust model
in spatial regression.
4.1.1 A Trust Model for Spatial Crowd Reporting
In this model, there is a crowd of n users U = {i, . . . , n} observing an environmental
process represented by the function f : Rn → R. Specifically, recalling the examples in
disaster management given in Section 1.3, f may represent the spreading of a nuclear
cloud generated by a nuclear accident, as it happened in the aftermath of the 2011 Japan
earthquake, or the waterborne disease that spread across the Haiti population due to
ground water contamination provoked by of the 2010 earthquake (Walsh, 2010). Gen-
erally speaking, f represents an output varying spatially across a set of input locations,
where the domain of f is the continuous set of locations describing land area covered by
the process and the codomain is the range of real values that such a process can assume.
Therefore, we will conveniently describe the model for the case of n = 2 to conform to
with the case of spatial functions.
Thus, in a multi-reporting setting, each user i reports a set of pi observations, where each
observation ri,j provides (i) a location xi,j ∈ R2, namely the position of the observer, (ii)
the output yi,j ∈ R, namely the value measured at xi,j and (iii) the precision θi,j ∈ R
with 0 < LB < θi,j < UB, namely the precision of yi,j . In particular, as also detailed in
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Section 1.2, θi,j may be referring to the precision of a sensor, or user’s confidence level, or
the variance of some repeated measurements. Summing up, R = {〈xi,j , yi,j〉|j = 1 . . . pi}
is the dataset of dimension p =
∑n
i=1 pi; x = {xi,j |i = 1, . . . n j = 1, . . . pi} is the set
of the reported locations and y = {yi,j |i = 1, . . . n j = 1, . . . pi} is the vector of the
observations.
Then, as in the MaxTrust model (Section 3.1.1), we assume that each user has an
individual level of trustworthiness denoted by the parameter ti ∈ (0, 1] (1 for a fully
trustworthy user and 0 for an untrustworthy use) and t = (t1, . . . , tn) is the set of such
trustworthiness parameters. Specifically, we use the concept of consistency to charac-
terise the trustworthiness of a user. In more detail, trustworthiness is shaped on the
level of how the user reports observations that are representative samples of f . That is,
a trustworthy user is expected to consistently report observations sampling from f with
a random noise. In contrast, untrustworthy users typically reports observations uncor-
related with f . (see Section 3.1 for further details). Given this, we assume that reported
observation are normally distributed with respect to the function value. Formally, let
y˜i,j be actual value of f at xi,j , i.e. y˜i,j = f(xi,j) then we consider that yi,j is a noisy
measurement of y˜i,j with an additive zero-mean, Gaussian noise i,j parametrised by ti.
That is:
p(y˜i,j |yi,j , ti) =
√
tiθi,j
2pi
exp
(
− tiθi,j(y˜i,j − yi,j)
2
2
)
(4.1)
or conventionally written as:
yi,j = y˜i,j + i,j , y˜i,j = f(xi,j), i,j ∼ N (0, 1/(tiθi,j)) (4.2)
In such a way, we obtain the same noise scaling effect of an untrustworthy estimate
described in MaxTrust (Section 3.1.2), where an untrustworthy estimate is downgraded
by increasing its uncertainty proportionally to ti
In more detail, Figure 4.1 shows an example of six users with different kinds of trust-
worthy behaviours in observing a one-dimensional function f represented by beta distri-
bution with parameters α = 6, β = 18 (blue-dotted line). Specifically, in this example,
each user repors 5 estimates along x, and each estimate is plotted as its mean value yi,j
(starred point) and the bars denote the 95% confidence interval given by ±2/tiθi,j . From
this, we can see that user 1 and user 3 are highly trustworthy since all their estimates
are consistent with the actual value f(xi,j). Furthermore, user 2 has only one (the left-
most) estimate that is inconsistent with f(xi,j), so it’s behaviour is mostly trustworthy.
In contrast, users 4 and 6 are highly untrustworthy reporters since all of their estimate
are significantly distant (more than 2 standard deviations) from f(xi,j). Finally, the be-
haviour of user 6 is mostly untrustworthy since only one of its five estimates is consistent
with f(xi,j). Therefore, while in principle user trustworthiness is assumed to be binary,
i.e. its strategy is either or not to submit trustworthy estimates, then we capture such
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Figure 4.1: Example of trustworthy (user 1, 2, 3) and untrustworthy (user 4, 5, 6)
reporting behaviour.
a behavioral feature as a (0,1] value, represented by the ti parameter, based on the level
of consistency of the user’s estimates with the ground truth’s function. However, the
challenge here is how to find the values of ti when f is not available, thus we detail how
we address this problem through a Gaussian process regression approach in the following
section.
4.1.2 Trust-Based Heteroscedastic Gaussian Process Regression
As discussed in Section 2.4, the Gaussian process (GP) is a machine learning tool widely
used to solve non-linear regression problems in a principled Bayesian framework per-
forming analytically tractable inference (Rasmussen, 2004). Specifically, we use the GP
to infer f from the dataset described above taking into account the trustworthiness
parameters of each users. In particular, given the noise model stated in Equation 4.2,
where the noise is individually set on the observations as a function of the reported
precision and the trustworthiness parameter, then we look at the family of heteroscedas-
tic Gaussian process models (HGP) that deals with data with individual noise terms.
In particular, we use the HGP model studied by Goldberg et al. (1997) discussed in
Section 2.4 that assumes that the noise terms are jointly independent. In our setting,
this corresponds to the assumption that (i) a user reports independent precisions and
(ii) a user is individually trustworthy. These, as discussed in Section 2.5, are reasonable
assumptions in spatial crowd reporting settings.
Specifically, we define a new trust-based HGP model obtained from combining the Gold-
berg et al.’s HGP to the model of untrustworthy reports defined by Equation 4.1. For-
mally, a GP prior is placed over f with a mean function m(x), (hereafter we assume to
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be zero for simplicity), and a covariance function or kernel K(x, x′), that is:
f(x) ∼ GP(0,K(x, x′)) (4.3)
From this, in analogy with Equations 4.1 and 4.2, we assume that the likelihood of a
vector of observations y given f is a normal distribution expressed as follows:
p(y|f) = N (y|f, i,j) i,j ∼ N (0, 1/(tiθi,j) (4.4)
Now, let x∗ be a new test location in the domain of f , and y∗ be the corresponding
unobserved output, then the joint distribution of y∗ and y under the current model is a
Gaussian PDF written as follows:[
y
y∗
]
∼ N
(
0,
[
K(x,x) + Σx K(x,x∗)
K(x∗,x) K(x∗,x∗)
])
(4.5)
where
Σx = diag((tiθi,j)
−1) (4.6)
Specifically, Σx is the diagonal matrix of the noise terms i,j denoting that the noise of
each input e covariance matrix is jointly regulated by θi,j and ti. Notice that, if such
a noise is constantly set to σn, then Equation 4.5 is the same equation of the standard
GP with Σx = σnI.
Under such a model, predictions can be made by conditioning x∗ to the set of reports
collected from the crowd R, given the trustworthiness of individual crowd members be
defined by t. Then, using the marginalisation properties of the Gaussian distributions,
the predictive distribution of f(x∗), i.e. the density over the function at the test location,
is derived as follows.
p(y∗|x,y,x∗, t) = N (E[y∗], σ2(y∗)) (4.7)
where
E[y∗] = K(x∗,x)[K(x,x) + Σx]
−1y (4.8)
σ2(y∗) = K(x∗,x∗)−K(x∗,x)[K(x,x) + Σx]−1K(x,x∗) (4.9)
Furthermore, integrating out f from Equation 4.4 using the GP prior of Equation 4.3,
then we derive the marginal log-likelihood as follows:
log p(y|x, t,θ) =− 1
2
yT [K(x,x) + Σx]
−1y
− 1
2
log|K(x,x) + Σx| − n
2
log(2pi) (4.10)
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As we notice, the model depends on a set of hyperparameters Θ that includes the k
hyperparameters θ of the covariance function K, controlling its smoothness properties,
and the n trustworthiness parameters. Such hyperparameters define the properties of
the model for a particular set of input observations.
In summary, we derived the key equations of the TrustHGP to predict the mean (Equa-
tions 4.8) and the variance (Equations 4.9) of f from the data at any input location.
In particular, the marginal likelihood is useful to train the GP for model selection.
Specifically, this expression allows us to derive the maximum likelihood estimates of the
hyperparameters through maximising the function as follows:
ΘML = {θML, tML} = arg max
θ′,t
(log p(y|x, t,θ) (4.11)
Therefore, in a similar vein to Kersting et al. (2007), we adopt the maximum likelihood
estimation approach to learn the hyperparameters and, as the next step, we provide an
algorithm to perform such a likelihood maximisation computationally.
Before this, as introduced in Section 2.5, we observe that there is another model pre-
sented by Groot et al. (2011) which deals with regression with multiple reports using
the standard GP with a rational quadratic covariance function, that is
K(x∗,x) = σf
(
− 1
2
(x− x′)TA−1(x′ − x)
)
(4.12)
This is a kernel that has an individual length scales li for each input dimension denoted
as A = diag(l21, . . . , l
2
p), and σf is a signal noise parameter. Then, likewise our approach,
they use the maximum marginal likelihood estimator to learn the hyperparameters re-
ferring to each length scale li as the accuracy (trustworthiness) of the input i. However,
given that their model is not designed to take the precisions θi,j into account, it also
suffers from scalability issues when the set of p hyperparameters (one for each report) is
large. In contrast, we only use the n trustworthiness hyperparameters (one for each user)
that is more feasible computationally. Given this, the algorithm to learn the hyperpa-
rameters and ultimately predict the function and the trustworthiness levels is described
in the next section.
4.2 The TrustHGP Algorithm
In this section, we describe the algorithm, called TrustHGP, for computing the trust-
worthiness parameters and the predictive distribution of f maximising the marginal
log-likelihood of our trust-based HGP (see Algorithm 4). However, since such a likeli-
hood is non-linear function, then its maximisation is not tractable analytically and it
must be carried out numerically. Specifically, we use the non-linear conjugate gradient
method (Saad and Saad, 1996). This is a iterative method for minimising quadratic
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Algorithm 4 TrustHGP (Non-linear conjugate gradient)
Variables :
R : Report set.
Θ(h) : Hyperparameters at the h-th iteration.
θ(0) : Initial guess of the covariance function’s hyperparameters.
∆Θ(h) : Negative derivatives of the marginal log-likelihood with respect to
the hyperparameters of the h-th iteration.
x∗ : Test inputs.
error : Estimation error bound.
hmax : Maximum number of iterations.
Algorithm TrustGP(R,x∗)
1: t(0) := 〈1, . . . , 1〉
2: Θ(0) := 〈θ(0), t(0)〉
3: s(0) = − ∂
∂Θ
(
log p(y|x,Θ(0))) (Equation 4.10)
4: h := 0
5: while ( |Θ(h−1) −Θ(h)| < err and h < hmax ) do
6: h := h+ 1
7: ∆Θ(h) := − ∂
∂Θ
(
log p(y|x,Θ(h−1))
8: β(h) := (∆Θ
(h))T (∆Θ(h)−∆Θ(h−1))
(∆Θ(h−1))T∆Θ(h−1) (Polak-Ribie`re method)
9: s(h) := ∆Θ(h−1) + β(h)s(h−1) (Wolfe line search)
10: α(h) := arg maxα p(y|x, (Θ(h−1) + αs(h−1)))
11: Θ(h) := Θ(h−1) + α(h)s(h)
12: end while
13: Θ(h) := 〈θ′(h), t(h)〉
14: Compute E[y∗|x∗] as by Equation 4.8.
15: Compute σ2(y∗|x∗) as by Equation 4.9.
16: return (t(h), E[y∗], σ2(y∗))
functions (that in our case is equal to minimise the negative log-likelihood) following
the steepest conjugate gradient direction given by the analytical gradient of the function.
In particular, as is apparent from the illustration of Figure 4.2, such a method typically
converges to a (local) minimum faster than gradient descent that follows perpendicular
(zig-zag) directions.
In more detail, the algorithm is described as follows. Step 1 and 2 initialises the hy-
perparameters with t uniformly set to 1, that corresponds to start by assuming that
all the users as trustworthy, and making a random guess of θ. Then, the conjugate
gradient loop (step 5-12) computes the gradient with respect to the hyperparameters of
the previous iteration θ(h−1) and the search directions given by the β and α parameters.
In particular, there are a number of methods for computing β based on different ver-
sions of the conjugate gradient algorithm (Saad and Saad, 1996). Among these, we use
Polak-Ribiere method (step 8) that was found to be computationally more stable in our
setting. Then, step 10 computes the search directions s and the step length along each
directions α through Wolfe line search condition. In particular, by using such a condition
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Figure 4.2: A comparison of the convergence of the gradient descent and the conjugate
gradient methods in minimising a quadratic function.
to update of the step length, the method is proved to ensure stability and convergence
(Wolfe, 1969). Finally, the hyperparameters are updated according to the new α and s
in step 11. After convergence is achieved, and such a convergence is empirically reached
in 20-100 iterations, then the algorithm returns the trustworthiness values from the last
iteration and the mean and variance predictions of the function at the test inputs x∗.
Analysing its complexity, the algorithm requires O(p3) time to compute the output due
to the inversion of the covariance matrix that is a lower-bound complexity for any GP.
However, after the inversion of the the covariance matrix, then prediction only takes
O(p) time for the predictive mean and O(p2) for the predictive variance.
Having now described our TrustHGP algorithm, the following section provides its em-
pirical evaluation against other non-trust GP regression approaches.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
In order to empirically evaluate our TrustHGP, we conduct experiments on both syn-
thetic and real-world data. In the first experiment, we test the algorithm on synthetic
data simulating spatial crowd reporting with different levels of untrustworthy users
within the crowd (Section 4.3.1). Then, the second experiments, we look at the key dis-
aster response application of crowdsourced radiation monitoring evaluating TrustHGP
in making spatial predictions on a dataset of crowdsourced radiation data from the 2011
Japan’s earthquake (Section 4.3.2).
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Figure 4.3: Beta probability distribution for different values of shape parameters.
4.3.1 Experiment on Synthetic Data
In this experiment, we evaluate TrustHGP in estimating a one-dimensional function from
the reports provided by a crowd of untrustworthy observers. Specifically, the experiment
is set up as follows. The spatial function f is a beta distribution, Beta(α, β) with the
two positive shape parameters α and β randomly sampled, i.e. {α, β} ∼ U [1, 20]. In
particular, such a distribution can reproduce various shapes of a continuous function by
tuning the two positive parameters α and β as it is showed by Figure 4.3. Then, a number
of observations are provided by a crowd of 20 users. Specifically, each user i reports pi
estimates 〈x, y, θi〉, with pi ∼ [3, 20], where x is a point randomly selected in [0,1] (i.e.
the domain of f), y is the observed output and θi is the reported precision, respectively.
Specifically, each report contains noisy observations of f generated as follows:
θ ∼ U [0.5, 20] x ∼ U [0, 1] (4.13)
y = f(x) +   ∼ N (0, θ−1) (4.14)
Then, to simulate a percentage ρ of untrustworthy users within the crowd, the estimates
of untrustworthy users are added with an extra noise w drawn from ±[1, 5], formally:
y = f(x) + + w  ∼ N (0, θ−1) w ∼ ±U [1, 5] (4.15)
In particular, we adopt such setting for generating noise in order to avoid to introduce
biases in our results as detailed in Section 3.3.1. Finally, to compare our TrustHGP
against other non-trust GPs, we consider the following benchmark methods:
• Standard GP: This algorithm refers to the standard homoscedastic GP discussed
in Section 2.5.
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• HGP: This algorithm is the Goldberg et al.’s HGP (Section) 2.5.1 that uses θi as
input noise terms and without including the trustworthiness parameters.
• OptimalHGP: This is the hypothetical optimal HGP provided with the knowledge
of the correct values of trustworthiness for each user. That is, trustworthy users
are set with ti = 1 and untrustworthy users are set with ti = 0.
Thus, the four algorithms: GP, HGP, TrustHGP, OptimalHGP were tested in N repeated
trials. For the core of the GPs, we used the squared-exponential covariance function
described as follows:
K(x,x′) = σf exp
(
− 1
2l2
(x− x′)2
)
(4.16)
where the two hyperparameters are the signal variance σf and the length scale l respec-
tively. Then, to measure the quality of the distribution predicted by each method, we
use the accuracy metrics used described below.
Accuracy Metrics
We want to measure the accuracy of the algorithm in terms of the accuracy in predict-
ing f as well as the level of uncertainty in the predictive distribution. In particular,
we seek accuracy metrics that consider jointly the predictive mean and the predictive
uncertainty in scoring predictors. To this end, we draw from the lessons learned by
the “evaluating predictive uncertainty challenge” (EPUC) that was organised within
the machine learning community in December 2004, with the aim of evaluating a num-
ber of submitted prediction methods competing in various classification and regression
tasks (Quinonero-Candela et al., 2006). Such a challenged revealed that a good scoring
method requires the property of properness in the sense that the true generative distri-
bution must have the best expected score. However, Kohonen and Suomela (2006), a
team that participated to the challenge, discuss that in addition to properness another
requirement for such a scoring rule is the non-locality property. i.e the score must also
be distance sentitive and dependent on how much predictive probability mass is placed
near the true target. In contrast, a local score depends only on the predictive density
exactly at the true target values. Therefore, following the suggestions of the authors, we
use the non-local scoring rule of thecontinuous ranked probability score (CRPS) (Gneit-
ing and Raftery, 2007). In particular, for scoring Gaussian predictive distributions, the
CRPS averaged over K point predictions and N simulations is given by:
CRPS (N (y,σ2),y∗) = 1
NK
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
σi,j
(
1√
pi
− 2ϕ
(
y∗i,j − yi,j
σi,j
)
−
y∗i,j − yi,j
σi,j
(
2φ
(
y∗i,j − yi.j
σi
)
− 1
))
(4.17)
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Figure 4.4: Performance of the four methods measured by the root mean square error
error (a) and the continuous ranked probability score (b).
where ϕ and φ denote the probability density function and the cumulative distribution of
a standard normal random variable, respectively. Specifically, 〈yi,j , σi,j〉 is the predicted
Gaussian estimate of the actual point y∗i,j at the i-th simulation.
Furthermore, we will also use the root mean square error (RMSE) averaged over K
predictions and N simulations to measure of accuracy of the prediction only based on
the predictive mean. That is:
RMSE (y,y∗) =
√√√√ 1
NK
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
(y∗i,j − yi,j)2 (4.18)
Given these accuracy metrics, the results of this experiment are discussed in the following
section.
Results
The results of run N = 200 simulation varying the vaue of ρ as follows: ρ = { 0, 10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 60 }. are showed in Figure 4.4. From this, we can see that, as expected, the
global RMSE (Figure 4.4 (a)) (the lower the better) of the algorithms grows progressively
with ρ, meaning that a large number of untrustworthy users penalises the accuracy of
the predictions. Notwithstanding, the TrustHGP outperforms the other methods by up
to 34% when ρ = 30 (the statistical significance of this result was tested by a paired
t-test at the 0.01 level: p = 3.4 · 10−33, t(14.48) = 0.11). In particular, its error is very
close to the optimum until ρ = 30 and is generally the lowest for ρ < 50.
Another interesting result is the CRPSs of the four methods showed in Figure 4.4 (b)
(the higher, the better). From this, we can see that, the scores of the TrustGP are
significantly higher than the other methods (excluding the OptimalHGP) for any ρ
value. In particular, it outperforms the standard GP by 80% when ρ = 30 (statistical
significance tested by a paired t-test at the 0.01 level: p = 3.38 ·10−124, t(56.37) = 0.06).
Thus, this shows that our algorithm is not only the most accurate among the tested
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Figure 4.5: Example of regression of the four methods on a sample dataset of 20
users, 241 data points and 30% untrustworthy users.
methods but it is also very informative due to a low predictive uncertainty. Interestingly,
the CRPS also reveals that the standard GP ranks below the the HGP in terms of
predictive uncertainty, even though the RMSE of the former is typically lower.
In more detail, Figure 4.5 shows the typical prediction results produced by the four
methods. Given the dataset illustrated in Figure 4.5 (a), with 20 users, with totally
241 reports, and ρ = 30, the Standard GP prediction is showed in Figure 4.5 (b). In
particular, such a prediction is very noisy due to the training that increases the signal
noise σn to include all the points, thus exhibiting a behaviour similar to the CU method
(Section 3.3.1). Furthermore, the HGP prediction showed in Figure 4.5 (c)) has typically
lower uncertainty but is inaccurate due to the effect of chasing every points considered
by the process to a trustworthy report. In contrast, the TrustHGP prediction showed
in Figure 4.5 (d) is the best trade-off between accuracy and low uncertainty due to a
correct estimation of trustworthiness parameters that allows the process to exclude most
of the untrustworthy points. In particular, consistently with the scores, its prediction is
very close (almost identical) to the one of the OptimalGP showed Figure 4.5 (e), that
makes our results more valuable given that the latter has the advantage of knowing the
trustworthiness values in advance.
Thus, we showed that our method outperforms the benchmarks in both accuracy and
informativeness in predicting the function from synthetic data. Now, to reinforce this
empirical result, we provide an evaluation of the TrustHGP also on real-world data.
4.3.2 Experiment on Real-World Data
In this experiment, we consider the real-world application of crowdsourced radiation
monitoring in disaster response introduced in Section 1.1. In particular, we refer to
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the scenario of the aftermath of the 2011 Japan earthquake where the effort of local
communities contributed to install more than 500 radiation sensors across the country in
less than two weeks following the disaster. Such a crowdsourced sensor network, created
through the COSM platform (cosm.com), that we will refer to as the COSM network,
provided real-time radioactivity measurements to first responders and was acknowledged
to be of great help for monitoring the spreading of the nuclear cloud that was generated
by a nuclear power plants damaged by the earthquake. However, a key challenge for the
first responders was to manage such large amount of sensor data into a global spatial
prediction of radiations, whilst taking into account the fact that some sensors were
verifiably unreliable (Borden, 2011). Against this background, we now detail how to
apply the TrustHGP in such a radiation monitoring application to help address this
challenge.
Dataset
The COSM network consists of 557 sensors placed at known locations and each sen-
sor provides readings at the average frequency is of 2 readings per hour. Specifically,
the sensor periodically reports (i) the measured radiation value in the standard unit
of microsieverts per hour (µSv/h) and (ii) the timestamp of such a measurement. The
complete description of the COSM dataset in provided in the Appendix B. Furthermore,
the ministry of education, culture, sport, science and technology of Japan (MEXT)
maintains a national radiation sensor network named SPEEDI: system for prediction
of environmental emergencies and dose information (www.bousai.ne.jp). SPEEDI in-
cludes 2122 sensors that provide readings in the unit of µSv/h at the frequency of 6
measurement per hour.. Specifically, Figure 4.6(b) shows the map of the SPEEDI net-
work. From these two networks, we downloaded the data for each sensor over one day,
1 April 2012, i.e. 13 months after the earthquake.1 For each sensor, we compute the
mean and the variance of the readings that we refer to as the expected measurement xi
and the variance θ−1i of the sensor i, respectively. In more detail, Figure 4.6 shows the
map of (a) the COSM network and (b) the SPEEDI network.
In radiation monitoring, the SPEEDI network is typically considered more reliable than
the COSM network, therefore we use the SPEEDI data to build a ground truth for our
experiment as follows. We use the standard GP to predict the spatial field of radiations
from the SPEEDI dataset and such a prediction is shown in Figure 4.7 (a) as a radiation
heat map with a colormap in the scale of 0 - 400 µSv/h. Then, we use the mean value
of such prediction as a comparative ground truth to evaluate the predictions made on
the COSM data.
1The SPEEDI network offers digitalised data only starting from April 2012 so this date was selected
such that data were available by both the two networks.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Picture of the 557 radiation sensors of the COSM network (a) and the
2122 radiation sensors of the SPEEDI sensors (b) located in Japan.
As in the previous experiment, we use the squared-exponential function as the kernel of
our GPs. However, given that the squared-exponential function is a stationary function,
i.e. its value depends only on the distance between x and x′, then such a function
can be applied to location data and compute the covariance matrix directly using the
geographical line distance between the two location points as follows:
K(x,x′) = σf exp
(
− d(x,x
′)2
2l2
)
(4.19)
where
d(x,x′) = R0
√
x2 + y2 (4.20)
x = (lon− lon0)cos(lat) (4.21)
y = (lat− lat0) (4.22)
Specifically, R0 is the mean radius of the Earth equal to 6,371 km, and 〈lat0 = 24◦, lon0 =
124◦〉 is the origin point for the projection. In particular, the distance between x and
x′, i.e. d(x,x′), is computed through the equilateral projection described above, that
is computationally more efficient than computing the grand-circle, Haversine distance.
Given this setting, we discuss the results of the experiment in the next section.
Results
To analyse the behaviour of the TrustHGP with different tests on the COSM dataset,
we sample 90% of the COSM sensors in N = 100 rounds. In each rounds, we run
the Standard GP and the TrustHGP and their predictions are compared against the
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Figure 4.7: Radiation heat maps showing the following predictions: the standard
GP on the SPEEDI dataset (a), the standard GP on the COSM dataset (b) and the
TrustHGP on the COSM dataset (c).
GP-SPEEDI ground truth using the metrics described in Section 4.3.1. Figure 4.7 (b)
and Figure 4.7(c) shows the predictive mean of the standard GP and the TrustHGP
on the COSM data, respectively. In particular, we can see that all the methods are
similar in predicting a field with a high peak of radioactivity near the area Fukushima
that is indeed the area that was most significantly affected by the nuclear accident. In
particular, the estimated radiations in such an area is around 0.35 µSv/h, i.e. four times
the average radiation level of 0.09 µSv measured in Japan before the earthquake.2
In addition, Figure 4.9 shows the global scores for the two predictors in terms of (a)
RMSE and (b) CRPS. From this, we can see that our algorithm outperforms the standard
GP by 13% with respect to the absolute error (RMSE) (statistical significance tested by
a paired t-test at the 0.01 level: p = 2.31 · 10−167, t(197.99) = 95.27), and by 89% with
respect to the predictive uncertainty (statistical significance tested by a paired t-test at
the 0.01 level: p = 0, t(141.07) = −5.86 · 10−3). In particular, the result of the CRPS
is significant as it shows that our prediction is considerably more informative than a
normal GP prediction. This is even more evident by the 3D visualisation of the two
predictions showed in Figure 4.8 where the red bars show the 2σ predictive standard
deviation at each location. From this, we can see that the TrustHGP has very narrow
bars compared to the high bars of the standard GP. Finally, our method estimated that
17% of the COSM sensors and only 1% of the SPEEDI sensors as untrustworthy which
seems to be realistic given the nature of the crowdsourced COSM network opposed to
the national SPEEDI network.
In summary, we find that the TrustHGP improves the quality of spatial prediction of
nuclear radiations in this real-world application of crowdsourced radiation monitoring.
In particular, it improves significantly in terms of lower predictive uncertainty which is
2Data source: Japan Radiation Open Data sendung.de/japan-radiation-open-data
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Figure 4.8: Bar plots of the RMSE (a) and the CRPS (b) of the two GPs.
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Figure 4.9: 3D visualisation of the GP prediction (a) and the TrustHGP prediction
(b) on the COSM data.
a valuable property as our method generally provides highly informative estimates of
the radiation levels at specific locations.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we showed that our trust-based approach effectively addresses the prob-
lem of estimating non-stationary quantities from untrustworthy data that complements
the previous results of MaxTrust about stationary values in the same setting. In par-
ticular, we presented a new trust-based heteroscedastic Gaussian process for spatial
regression to model a dataset of crowdsourced data reported by untrustworthy users.
The salient feature of such a model is to integrate user trust learning in spatial regres-
sion through the principled heteroscedastic Gaussian process framework using a set of
user trustworthiness parameters to scale the noise of the user’s reported estimates.
Then, we presented the TrustHGP algorithm to estimate the hyperparameters under our
model, including the learning of the trustworthiness of each user, using the maximum
marginal likelihood estimator. Evaluating our method on synthetic data, we show that
it outperform the standard, non-trust GPs being 34% more accurate and 80% more
informative. Furthermore, a real application to the problem of crowdsourced radiation
monitoring in Japan showed that our method estimates the radiation field with 13% lower
error and 89% lower predictive uncertainty compared to the standard GP. However, we
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envisage that the qualities of the TrustHGP could be advanced by considering also the
temporal dimension into the spatial evaluation of trustworthiness and inference could
be extended to a broader spectrum of information sources such as mobile sensors and
single observations. Therefore, we outline the plan for future work in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this report, we developed a novel trust-based approach to make reliable inference
on untrustworthy information in crowdsourcing applications. In particular, we focused
on the inference tasks of information fusion and spatial regression with untrustworthy
crowdsourced data. The motivation behind this research is that the data collected
through the crowd is typically untrustworthy because it is provided by unreliable sources
who may be inaccurate, uncommitted to the task and/or can also strategise which
information to report. The key requirement in these applications is to combine the
multiple reports gathered from the crowd into a predictive output of the underlying
problem. In this context, the major challenge has been outlined in producing good
quality aggregated estimates in the presence of untrustworthy reports. In more detail,
this problem relates to the requirement of identifying trustworthy users within a crowd
and evaluating a user ’s trustworthiness according to the quality of its reports. Given
this, we considered the approach of modelling user trustworthiness as a key informative
concept for making reliable inference on crowdsourced data.
In more detail, in Chapter 2, the relevant literature in the field of machine learning for
reliable crowdsourcing, including information fusion and spatial regression models, was
reviewed. Emphasis was given to the class of graphical models that focus on learning the
accuracy of the single user from crowdsourced datasets. However, the main limitation
of such models lies in the fact that they do not consider users’ reported uncertainties as
part of the input data. This is a problem because crowd reported observations, generated
through smartphones, do not only include point-based observations but also reported
uncertainty values that numerically quantify the precision of the user with regard to its
observation. As such, crowdsourcing must permit solutions in which inference takes into
account such reported uncertainties in a crowdsourced dataset. In addition, in the field of
information fusion, we discussed a number of methods that deal with the fusion of prob-
abilistic estimates in the single-hypothesis and the multiple-hypothesis setting. These
are the CI method and the CU method respectively. Whilst the latter was identified
as the conservative fusion benchmark because of its property of unifying the estimates
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under the most general output, the former was considered as a more valid basis for the
design of our trust-based fusion method due to its property of reducing noise in fused
estimates. Moreover, to address the requirement of identifying untrustworthy reports
within a crowdsourced dataset, we discussed density-based outlier detection methods
and sensor fusion algorithms for untrustworthy sensors. In particular, the former and
the Reece et al.’s algorithm were considered as suitable representatives of these two
classes respectively, and were included as benchmarks to evaluate our approach. Fur-
thermore, we provided the key background of spatial inference with crowdsourced data
when presenting the Gaussian process (GP) regression framework. In particular, we
considered the class of heteroscedastic Gaussian processes (HGP) to model data with
input-dependent noise that are suitable for dealing with reports with individual uncer-
tainties as our problem requires. However, the standard HGP regression model does not
provide any support against untrustworthy input data. To address this shortcoming, we
developed a new trust-based HGP model for spatial regression that considers different
levels of trustworthiness on each input.
The contribution of this work was detailed in the Chapters 3 and 4. Specifically, Chapter
3 presented our trust-based fusion model for crowdsourcing stationary quantities, taking
as an application example a crowdsourced target localisation problem. The key feature
of such a model is the introduction of a parametric representation of the uncertainty of a
reported observation based the level of trustworthiness of the user. In so doing, the model
can effectively reduce the noise of untrustworthy estimates in the aggregated output.
In addition, we developed the MaxTrust algorithm to perform approximated maximum
likelihood inference of the trustworthiness parameter and the fused estimate under such a
model. The key qualities of MaxTrust are as follows: (i) it estimates user trustworthiness
and the fused output without prior knowledge of the ground truth, (ii) it is free from any
control parameter and (iii) its time complexity is polynomial in the size of the report set.
From our experimental evaluation, empirical results show that MaxTrust outperforms
the benchmarks on both synthetic and real-world data. Specifically, our algorithm is 52%
more accurate and 80% more consistent (low predictive uncertainty) evaluated on target
localisation tasks with simulated data. Furthermore, when employed in an application
of crowdsourced cell tower localisation, MaxTrust improves the localisation accuracy by
21% compared to the other methods. In practice, corresponds to an average lowering of
the error by 185 meters.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 detailed our model of trust-based heteroscedastic Gaussian pro-
cess (HGP) regression for crowdsourcing spatial functions. This model integrates the
trust approach underpinning MaxTrust within the principled Bayesian inference frame-
work of heteroscedastic Gaussian process model. Then, the training of the hyperpa-
rameter through the maximum marginal likelihood estimator reveals the level of trust-
worthiness of the single user. Experiments on synthetic and real-world data show the
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efficacy of our method. Specifically, the TrustHGP empirically outperforms the non-
trust GP benchmarks by 34% in terms of accurate and by 80% in terms of predictive
uncertainty in simulated experiments. In addition, the TrustHGP showed a significant
impact when applied to the disaster response application of crowdsourced radiation mon-
itoring. In particular, using radiation data from the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster
provided by crowdsourced sensors, our method outperforms the benchmarks in making
more accurate, by 13%, and with significantly lower uncertainty predictions, by 89%, of
the radiation spatial field. Given these results, future extensions of the current model
will allow the TrustHGP to integrate jointly the temporal and the spatial dimension in
the evaluation of trustworthiness.
5.1 Future Work
The work presented in this report is an important step towards achieving the goal of
delivering reliable inference models for crowdsourced information. The limitations of
the models presented in this report and the requirements that were not achieved so far
in this work pave the way for our future research. Specifically, the areas that we intend
to investigate in the remaining 16 month of this PhD are as follows:
• Spatio-Temporal Inference. To fully meet requirement 2 of spatio-temporal
inference of untrustworthy data, we need to include the time dimension in the
trustworthiness evaluation in combination with the spatial inference performed
by our TrustHGP model. This will allow us to characterise the dynamic trust
behaviour of a user. For example, a user can be untrustworthy only in selected
time windows or it can be particularly inaccurate only when observing the target
from certain locations. In this context, the GP framework used by the TrustHGP
is sufficiently flexible to integrate time analysis and spatial inference. However,
to doing so, research must address the issue of representing trustworthiness as a
temporal function in the GP model.
• Active Learning (AL)-Driven Incentives. Another requirement of this re-
search lies at the intersection of the two areas of incentive engineering for crowd-
based interactions and active learning from crowd reported information. In more
detail, the use of incentives in crowdsourcing applications is typically targeted at
motivating users to exert the required effort in executing their assigned micro-task
and to deviate from the selfish behaviour of executing tasks with the minimum
effort to maximise their reward. In this space, Endriss et al. (2011) claim that
the principle of an effective incentive strategy for rational agents is to design re-
wards such that incentives can balance the cost for an agent to deviate from its
best utility action to take another lower utility action that is required to achieve
system-wide desirable outputs. On the other hand, incentives must be driven by
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active learning on the data. Specifically, online predictions based on the incoming
reports from the crowd must guide the decision of where to take the next ground
observation based on the regions where there is higher uncertainty (Quinn et al.,
2011). Drawing these two points together, we envisage that an important area for
further research will focus on combining active learning and incentive engineering
to motivate crowds to provide requested information.
• Reinforcement Learning (RL) for Task Verification. In Section 1.1, we
briefly discussed the role of verification as a means for ensuring data accuracy
and we also introduced the challenges implied by the verification of crowdsourced
data. However, a concrete work on this problem has not yet been undertaken in
this research. Therefore, in our future work, we will consider possible directions for
researching the data verification problem. In particular, we will explore the idea
of using RL to learn budget-limited policies for verifying data in a crowdsourcing
process. In fact, a good strategy of verification must accommodate the cost of
requiring extra information needed to verify a reported opinion and its tradeoff
with the accuracy that is to be increased, given the budget constraint. In this
direction, we will research efficient verification strategies for crowdsourced data to
improve information quality in this setting.
To conclude, Figure 5.1 shows the timetable for the schedule of the reseach activities
listed above until the completion of the PhD, including also the following background
tasks:
• Conference papers: We aim to submit the results of our work to the research
communities from international AI and multi-agent systems conferences. In more
detail, we plan to submit a full paper describing our trust-based data fusion work
(Chapter 3) to the AAMAS 2013 conference (aamas-conference.org) and to de-
tail the contribution of our trust-based heteroscedastic Gaussian process (Chapter
4) in a full paper to be submitted to the IJCAI 2013 conference (ijcai.org). In
addition, the future work on task verification and active learning will be targeted
for publication in the AAAI 2013 conference (aaai.org).
• Journal paper: Upon achieving our goals concerning spatio-temporal inference
models and active learning-driven incentives, we aim to publish our results in an in-
ternational AI journal, AIJ (journals.elsevier.com/artificial-intelligence/)
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Appendix A
OpenSignalMap Cell Tower
Dataset
This appendix describes the crowdsourced dataset of cell detections collected by the
OpenSignalMap project that was used in the experiment presented in Chapter 3. The
intent of this project is to map cell towers and signal coverage by collecting reports about
cell detections submitted by Android devices. In particular, we received a set of 68, 714
reports collected in Septemper 2011 which were located in the area of Southampton,
UK, bounding box: 50.85 N, 1.25 W and 50.97 N, 1.525 W (see Figure A.1). Each
report is described by the following fields:
• entity id: Record identifier.
• inserted at: Timestamp of the detection.
• device type: Model of the device, e.g. HTC Desire, GT-I9000, Nexus S, etc.
• network type: Type of cellular connection: EDGE, GPRS, HSPA, UMTS, Un-
known.
• network name: Name of the network operator: Three, O2, Orange, T-Mobile,
Virgin, Vodafone, MCP Maritime Com, Unknown.
• network id: A 5 digit identifier of the network operator combining the Mobile
Country Code (MCC) (first 3 digits) and the Mobile Network Code (MNC) (second
2 digits): 23410 (O2-UK), 23415 (Vodafone-UK), 23420 (Three), 23430 (T-Mobile),
23433 (Orange-UK), 90112 (Telenoir Maritime Communications), Unknown.
• roaming: Flag indicating whether the device is connected via roaming: 1=roam-
ing, -1=non-roaming.
• my lat: Latitude (in degrees) of the device’s current location.
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Figure A.1: Screenshot showing the bounding box of the Southampton, UK area and
the location of the masts (based on the cell lat and cell lon fields) tagged within the
OpenSignalMaps dataset.
• my lon: Longitude (in degrees) of the device’s current location.
• my altitude: Altitude (in meters) at the device’s location.
• location source: Flag indicating the positioning system used to discover the
device’s location: 0=GPS, 1=WIFI.
• location inaccuracy: Precision (in meters) of the location fix.
• location speed: Speed (in meters/seconds) of the device over ground.
• rssi: Received signal strength in “Arbitrary Strength Unit” (ASU) (dBm = 2×ASU
- 113).
• CID: Cell Identifier.
• LAC: Local Area Code.
• cell lat: Latitude degrees of the mast location estimated by the OpenSignalMap
system (if available).
• cell lon: Longitude degrees of of the mast location estimated by the OpenSignalMap
system (if available).
• app version: Version of the OpenSignalMap-Android app used to generate the
report.
Specifically, the location inaccuracy had values ranging between 2 and 4930 meters and
the received signal strength indication (rssi) between 1 and 99 ASU. In addition, a
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(a) (b)
Figure A.2: Illustration of the topology and picture of the mast for a directional (a)
and an omni-directional (b) cellular network.
considerable number of reports were found to be duplicates and were removed. This
duplication was probably generated by the software feature available on the app that
enables the device to send reports periodically on behalf of the user, and is likely to
generate duplicates when the device is statically in one place. Thus, the dataset was
reduced by 66% after filtering, see Table A.1 which shows statistics for before and after
removing duplicates. In particular, it shows that the device type was unknown in 60%
of the reports and that 53% of the detections came from Vodafone cells. In addition,
more than 96% of the reports were sent using 3G mobile connection (GPRS + HSPA +
UMTS) and 67% of the devices used GPS for positioning.
Network operator Num. of reports (after filtering) Device type Num. of reports (after filtering)
Vodafone 31838 10308 HTC 3728 1455
Orange 10644 3712 Samsung 2903 1056
T-Mobile 10919 3925 Motorola 2480 612
O2 8492 2715 Orange MT 100 26
Three 4609 1794 LG 42 29
Virgin 1122 359 Sony Ericsson 2 1
MCP Maritine Com 1 1 Unknown 59486 20157
Unknown 1116 318
Network type Num. of reports (after filtering) Positioning Num. of reports (after filtering)
EDGE 2160 711 GPS 66165 22337
GPRS 33252 11725 WIFI 2576 1006
HSPA 26312 8847
UMTS 6691 1901
Unknown 325 159
Table A.1: The number of reports, before and after filtering, for network operator,
device types, network types and location sources.
Furthermore, the reports tagged a total of 2291 base stations whose locations are shown
in Figure A.1. Among these, we were able to reliably identify 157 masts as omni-
directional base stations through an on-site, visual inspection.1 In more detail, the two
topologies of cellular networks that are typically adopted for mobile telecommunications
based on directional and/or omni-directional radio masts are showed in Figure A.2. In
an omni-directional cellular network, the land area is divided into regular hexagonal cell.
1In the experiment presented in Chapter 3, we considered only the omni-directional masts with more
than 5 reports and this discarded 28 base stations from this group.
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A cell tower is placed in the centre of each cell with a set of antennas transmitting and
receiving at the assigned cell frequency range. Thus, the signal is radiated approximately
spherically (360 degrees angle) across the cell. In a directional cellular network, a cell
tower is placed at the corners of each cell and each tower has three sets of directional
antennas pointing in different directions with an opening angle of 120 degrees. In this
case, a mobile device receives the signal from three different masts within the same cell
depending on the nearest corner where it is located. We discussed in Chapter 3 that
directional networks are much more difficult to localise from this dataset because the
reports do not provide the information about the direction in which the cell tower lies.2
2Sometimes, an approximate bearing of the cell tower position can be inferred by knowing that the
carriers conventionally number the thee sectors of a cell in clockwise order and the sector number is
usually indicated by one digit of the CID (e.g. CID=jxxx where j is either 0=omni-directional, 1=south,
2=north-west or 3=north-east). However, we were not able to reliably identify such a digit for each
carrier in our data.
Appendix B
COSM Radiation Dataset
This appendix describes the radiation dataset provided by the Cosm sensors located in
Japan. In total, the dataset comprises 446 feeds from sensors. The datapoints provided
by each sensor are formatted according to the following XML template:
<feeds end= "end of period timestamp" start="start of period timestamp">
<feed id= "Sensor Pachube Identifier" >
<title > "Sensor name" </title >
<lat > "Sensor latitude" </lat >
<lon > "Sensor longitude" </lon >
<unit > "Unit of measurement" </unit >
<elevation > "Sensor altitude" </elevation >
<datapoints >
<value at= "timestamp" > "Value" </value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
Specifically, the feeds can classified as follows:
• Bad Unit: The unit of measurement is invalid.
• Unreadable Format: The feed is reported in an XML that not readable for
COSM.
• Empty Dataset: The series of datapoints is empty.
• Bad Values: The datapoint value is invalid.
• Single Datapoint: The series of datapoints has only one value.
• Multiple Datapoints: The feeds that report more than one datapoint for their
set of measurements. This category of feeds is the one that has been used for
performing the experiment presented in Section 4.3.2.
The number of feeds for each of these categories found in this dataset is reported in
Table B.1. This data is also showed graphically by the pie chart in Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Pie chart of the COSM dataset
Feeds
Bad Unit 22
Unreadable Format 3
Empty Dataset 27
Bad Values 2
Single Datapoint 150
Multiple Datapoints 242
Total 446
Table B.1: Analysis of the Pachube dataset
An example sample of seven feeds taken from the COSM dataset, with the category of
each feed indicated in the attached XML comments:
<feeds end ="2011 -08 -24 T17 :38:43Z" start ="2011 -07 -26 T17 :38:43Z">
<feed id="29316" > <!-- Multiple Datapoints -->
<title >Geiger Counter in Hachioji , Tokyo , JPN </title >
<lat >35.6660131471511 </ lat >
<lon >139.317798614502 </ lon >
<unit >uSv/h</unit >
<elevation >4m</elevation >
<datapoints >
<value at="2011 -08 -24 T16 :14:32.528963Z" >0.06666667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -26 T22 :40:36.575907Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -27 T11 :37:32.348107Z" >0.13333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -27 T23 :14:05.721960Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -28 T11 :59:15.094900Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -28 T23 :19:07.424571Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -29 T11 :41:06.914655Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
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<value at="2011 -07 -29 T23 :12:59.255784Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -30 T11 :59:39.987595Z" >0.18333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -30 T19 :10:39.382951Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -07 -31 T17 :53:47.445835Z" >0.14166668 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -01 T11 :59:34.912675Z" >0.075</value >
<value at="2011 -08 -01 T22 :59:57.363402Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -02 T11 :59:23.359377Z" >0.10000001 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -02 T23 :14:51.511688Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -03 T11 :59:34.050613Z" >0.075</value >
<value at="2011 -08 -03 T23 :59:44.540151Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -04 T11 :37:58.142513Z" >0.075</value >
<value at="2011 -08 -04 T23 :59:12.339526Z" >0.13333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -05 T11 :59:04.226102Z" >0.14166668 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -05 T20 :14:11.982138Z" >0.26666668 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -06 T11 :59:17.013373Z" >0.13333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -06 T23 :59:19.511640Z" >0.14166668 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -07 T08 :23:44.017187Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -07 T23 :59:04.459241Z" >0.10833334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -08 T07 :52:31.086786Z">0.15</value >
<value at="2011 -08 -08 T23 :59:19.166662Z" >0.10833334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -09 T11 :59:38.688544Z" >0.125</value >
<value at="2011 -08 -09 T20 :50:22.391484Z" >0.10833334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -13 T11 :59:37.708707Z" >0.10000001 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -13 T19 :01:46.534556Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -14 T11 :59:27.203382Z" >0.13333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -14 T23 :59:44.121526Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -15 T11 :59:01.963549Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -15 T23 :59:22.979722Z" >0.19166668 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -16 T11 :59:40.605287Z" >0.14166668 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -16 T18 :01:19.606337Z" >0.058333337 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -17 T08 :02:48.710350Z" >0.116666675 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -17 T23 :59:17.301783Z" >0.13333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -18 T11 :19:33.509494Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -18 T21 :50:28.700705Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -19 T11 :59:52.292633Z" >0.10833334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -19 T21 :55:34.910898Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -20 T11 :59:59.405274Z" >0.10833334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -20 T20 :11:57.677557Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -21 T03 :59:55.135269Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -21 T23 :59:52.765817Z" >0.09166667 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -22 T10 :57:21.091489Z" >0.125</value >
<value at="2011 -08 -22 T23 :59:53.335037Z" >0.083333336 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -23 T11 :59:23.872506Z" >0.13333334 </ value >
<value at="2011 -08 -23 T16 :15:24.313347Z" >0.075</value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
<feed id="25342" > <!-- Bad Unit -->
<title >radiation in Mitaka , Tokyo </title >
<lat >35.7015333818623 </ lat >
<lon >139.559712409973 </ lon >
<unit >?Sv/h</unit >
<datapoints >
<value at="2011 -06 -26 T14 :36:47.427950Z" >0.318</value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
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<feed id="29324" > <!-- Single Datapoint -->
<title >Radiation @ Futomi </title >
<lat >43.1882581168454 </ lat >
<lon >141.438689608967 </ lon >
<unit >uSv/h</unit >
<elevation >0</elevation >
<datapoints >
<value at="2011 -07 -16 T04 :47:37.376689Z">3.39</value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
<feed id="25885" > <!-- Empty Dataset -->
<title >Airborn radiation on 4F roof in Arakawa , Tokyo (uSv/h)</title >
<lat >35.7305931286104 </ lat >
<lon >139.79763507843 </ lon >
<unit >uSv/h</unit >
<elevation >12</ elevation >
<datapoints >
</datapoints >
</feed >
<feed id="26485" > <!-- Multiple Datapoints -->
<title >Mejiro Radiation Meter </title >
<lat >35.7203154126837 </ lat >
<lon >139.701633453369 </ lon >
<unit >uSv/h</unit >
<elevation >33.89 </ elevation >
<datapoints >
<value at="2011 -08 -24 T16 :38:34.356060Z" >0.130</value >
<value at="2011 -07 -26 T23 :59:12.132096Z" >0.138</value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
<feed id="22524" > <!-- Bad Values -->
<title >Monitoring data at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations: MP -1</title >
<lat >37.441609604785 </ lat >
<lon >141.028575897217 </ lon >
<unit >uSv/h</unit >
<datapoints >
<value at="2011 -06 -12 T12 :00:00.000000Z" >????????? </ value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
<feed id="25972" > <!-- Single Datapoint -->
<title >Geiger Counter Feeds from Fukushima ,JAPAN </title >
<lat >37.5577104682266 </ lat >
<lon >139.85312461853 </ lon >
<unit >uSv/h</unit >
<elevation >182</ elevation >
<datapoints >
<value at="2011 -08 -24 T16 :38:06.617218Z" >0.217</value >
</datapoints >
</feed >
</feeds >
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